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Presidential power is the power to persuade.
1
INTRODUCTION
Numerous scholars have written in recent years about presiden-
tial influence, although from widely different perspectives. On the
one hand, many commentators have criticized what they see as the
tyrannical and unchecked power of the president, who is often
thought to ignore the views of Congress, the federal bureaucracy,
and the public regarding appropriate policy.2 On the other hand,
I RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 10 (1980) (emphasis omitted).
2 See, e.g.,JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 1-11 (1993) (discussing the constitutional rationale for
the delegation to Congress of the power to declare war and observing President
George Bush's remark that "I didn't have to get permission from some old goat in the
United States Congress to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait"); HAROLD H. KOH,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR 6 (1990) ("Congress can and should seek to alter recurrent patterns of
wayward executive behavior by restructuring the institutional attributes that now
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some observers have discussed at length the supposed weaknesses
of the president, who is often viewed as unable to affect, let alone
direct, events in many policy areas.
3
Not surprisingly, these diverse factual conclusions often mirror
contrasting normative positions on the value of a strong president.
On one side, proponents of a strong president argue that a
government more directly controlled by a single decisionmaker-that
is, a strong unitary executive-frequently avoids many of the
collective action problems endemic to legislative bodies or dispersed
government organizations, such as Congress or a plural executive.
Borrowing from public choice theory, these proponents conclude
that the exercise of power by a centralized but politically visible and
create incentives for executive officials to act irresponsibly and for congressional and
judicial officials to permit such actions."); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL
PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED at x-xi (1985) (stating that "[i]n
a single office, the presidency, the powers of the American people have been invested,
making the most powerful office in the world" and describing the new American
regime as a "plebiscitary republic with a personal presidency"); ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY at viii (1973) ("The constitutional
Presidency ... has become the imperial Presidency and threatens to be the
revolutionary Presidency.");JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF
CONGRESS 33 (1981) ("The President of the United States has grown into a position
of overmastering influence over the legislative department of the government....
Congress is subservient to his will; its independence is in eclipse." (quoting HENRY C.
BLACK, THE RELATION OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER TO LEGISLATION at v, 1 (1919)));
JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 4 (1987) ("Presidents regularly 'go
over the heads' of Congress to the people at large in support of legislation and other
initiatives.").
3 See e.g., TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE: THE CASE FOR THE
STRONG EXECUTIVE 2 (1992) ("[N]o presidency that is weak can expect to govern as
well as it might. Only the strong presidency will do."); AARON WILDAVSKY, THE
BELEAGUERED PRESIDENCY at xi (1991) (attributing the "picture of beleaguered
presidents to the growth of political dissensus ... based on conflict between (largely
Democratic) egalitarians and (largely Republican) individualists and hierarchists"); L.
Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin, Introduction to THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY 1, 2
(L. Gordon Crovitz &Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989) ("[T]he Reagan administration...
had finally fallen victim to the mysterious political curse that had brought down each
of its predecessors of the previous two decades. This curse, of course, relates to the
general theme of a fettered executive branch and how legal constraints adversely
affect its performance and thus the performance ofgovernment generally."); Gordon
S. Jones & John A. Marini, Introduction to THE IMPERIAL CONGRESS: CRISIS IN THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 1, 1 (Gordon S.Jones &John A. Marini eds., 1988) ("America
faces a constitutional crisis stemming from two causes: the congressional failure to
observe traditional limits on its power, and the acquiescence of the other two
branches of government in the resulting arrogation of power."). See generally THE
TETHERED PRESIDENCY (Thomas M. Franck ed., 1981) (discussing the struggle for
power between the president and Congress and examining the prospects for a foreign
policy created by both branches).
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electorally accountable institution, such as the president, often
serves as the most effective and democratic form of government.
In a sense, it is a better form of "enterprise liability." Critics of
presidential power, on the other side, emphasize the failures of
recent presidents: their lack of accountability to many important
political constituencies (both majoritarian and minoritarian); their
inability to exercise effective leadership; and their apparent lack of
competence, let alone expertise.4 The succession of scandals
surrounding each of the last three presidents reinforces this view.
Proponents of this position ask why more power should be placed
in such a discredited and potentially tyrannical institution.
Despite these different assessments of the president's appropri-
ate role, most contributors to this debate seem to agree implicitly
on one thing: vesting enhanced authority in the person of the
president has increased his influence in the past and will continue
to do so if additional centralizing changes are implemented.' This
view is especially prevalent among legal academics, who generally
assume that giving greater formal legal control to the president
through devices such as a line-item veto or executive order 12,291,6
4 SeeJuan Linz, The Perils ofPresidentialism, 1J. DEM. 51,54-55 (1990) (discussing
the relative merits of a parliamentary versus presidential democracy and noting the
"fundamental contradiction" in presidential systems that creates "a strong, stable
executive with enough plebiscitarian legitimation to stand fast," as well as a "latent
suspicion" of the "personalization of power"); Lowl, supra note 2, at 156-57 (noting
that classic constitutional restraints on presidential power have been "broken down,"
leaving the chief executive with vast powers and "no sense of priorit[ies]"). For an
outline of the arguments in favor of greater administrative autonomy, see Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic RepublicanJustificationfor the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REv.
1511, 1512-16 (1992) (claiming that agencies are the source of civic republican values
and expertise).
' I used the feminine pronoun for the president in a previous article. See Robert
P. Inman & Michael A. Fitts, Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the
U.S. Historical Record, 6J.L. EcON. & ORGANIZATION 79 (Special Issue 1990). In this
Article, I will use the masculine pronoun for the president and the feminine pronoun
for members of Congress.
6 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981) (expanding presidential oversight
of the regulatory process to require all administrative agencies to prepare and submit
regulatory-impact-analysis reports), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg.
51,735 (1993) (revoking Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 and requiring the
centralized review of only significant rules), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1994);
see also Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985) (providing for presidential
oversight of the regulatory planning process), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58
Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1994); Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C.
§§ 3501-3520 (1988)) (creating an executive agency that develops and implements
federal information policies and guidelines).
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will necessarily increase his ability to work his will over the
bureaucracy, and the government in general.' Formal legal power,
in other words, will ultimately translate into real policy influence.
Similarly, political science scholars who study the strategic implica-
tions of political organization suggest that the political singularity
of the presidential persona is a source of immense informal political
strength. By applying insights derived from game theory, these
commentators delineate the president's strategic advantages in
overseeing the modern state, chiefly his influence on the public
agenda, ability to establish "focal points" for political bargaining,
and freedom from the costs of collective decisionmaking and
action.8 Indeed, even critics of a strong presidency recognize this
The Senate and the House of Representatives have each passed separate line-item
veto bills that enable the president to strike certain provisions of large spending and
taxation bills before signing them into law, thus increasing the president's formal
power vis-4-vis Congress. See Line Item Veto Act, H.R. 2, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (giving the president a general power to veto all or part of a budgetary item
or to repeal any tax benefit if the president determines that the veto or repeal would
reduce the federal budget deficit without impairing essential government functions
or harming national interests); Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 1995, S. 4, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995) (authorizing the president, under certain circumstances,
to "rescind all or part of any dollar amount of any discretionary budget authority
specified in an appropriation Act or conference report orjoint explanatory statement
accompanying a conference report on [this] Act, or veto any targeted tax benefit
which is subject to the terms of this Act").
'See Alfred C. Aman,Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatoiy
Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1236-37
(1988) ("Effective executive coordination of these various lawmaking centers, many
of which are executive in character, requires greater executive influence over policy
initiation and implementation as well as greater executive control over the legal
output of the bureaucracy." (citations omitted)); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas
H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1088
(1986) ("Both regulatory review and regulatory planning are necessary management
tools... and no program can be implemented in the modern regulatory state without
[them] by the Executive Office of the President."); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
181, 190 (1986) ("[A] supervisory role by the President [over regulatory agencies]
should help ensure that discretionary decisions by regulatory agencies are [more]
responsive to the public generally.").
8 For the most part, rational choice scholars who focus on the problems of
rational decisionmaking in multimember bodies have not added much to the debate.
See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 55-62 (1991)
(distinguishing between the rational choice and the welfare implications of public
choice); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE
REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 5-27 (1992) (discussing the current
conception of economics as a "conservative, laissez-faire movement" and arguing that
a "credible progressive movement must incorporate a well developed respect" for
costs and benefits). The reason is simple. Models of collective decisionmaking do
not explain much about the operation of an institution headed by a single individual
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centralization as an important-albeit unwelcome-source of the
president's power.
9
such as the president. Indeed, the so-called congressional dominance literature has
attempted to model agency activities as solely a function of the changing oversight of
legislative supervisory committees. For the classic study of the FTC, see Barry R.
-Weingast & MarkJ. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory
Policymaking By the Federal Trade Commission, 91J. POL. ECON. 765, 765, 793 (1983)
(hypothesizing that "agencies are controlled by the legislature" and concluding both
that "FTC activity is remarkably sensitive to changes" in the composition of the sub-
committee and that relevant oversight committees exert greater influence than does
the rest of Congress). See also infra note 76. Although this is an interesting and
powerful insight, it only provides a partial explanation of their behavior, if for no
other reason than because it ignores the president. See Terry M. Moe, Political Institu-
tions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 213, 236 (Special
Issue 1990) ("So far, the positive theory of institutions does not have much to say
about presidents.... [PIresidents ought to be far more central to a theory of political
institutions.").
The one case in which rational choice scholars have systematically focused on the
presidency is the case in which the presidency is modeled as a three-person voting
game between the two houses of Congress and the presidential veto. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn, The Article 1, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 528-33
(1992) (describing, in formal terms, the "sequential game" played by the president
and the legislature in accommodating their respective policy preferences); Michael
Fitts & Robert Inman, Controlling Congress: Presidential Influence in Domestic Fiscal
Policy, 80 GEO. L.J. 1737, 1769-73 (1992) (summarizing the literature and noting that
the presidential power of the veto plays a major role in legislative determination);
Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements & the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 440-44 (1989)
(arguing that administrative structures reflect ex ante agreements between the
legislature and President which limit ex post opportunistic behavior); McNollgast,
Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J.
705, 714 (1992) (noting that the legislative process is a collective action problem with
three actors to be accounted for: the Senate, the House, and the president). See
generally Gary J. Miller, Formal Theory and the Presidency, in RESEARCHING THE
PRESIDENCY: VITAL QUESTIONS, NEW APPROACHES 289, 289-92, 296-303 (George C.
Edwards III et al. eds., 1993) (summarizing the literature on the weakness of the veto
but showing how the threat that the abnormal informed voter will become involved
in political discourse and upset the normal condition of "pressure politics" operates
as a major source of presidential power, which allows the president to play a "crucial
role [in the] coordination of policy").
' Of course, the results of the 1994 congressional elections may suggest that
Congress is becoming a more powerful institution and that the presidency is
becoming weaker by comparison. Generalizing about the events of 1994 and 1995
may be quite hazardous, however. Some have suggested that this is part of a period
of political realignment in which traditional "ordinary" political relationships are
reshaped. See Walter D. Burnham, Realignment Lives: The 1994 Earthquake and Its
Implications, in THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY: FIRST APPRAISALS 363, 363 (Colin
Campbell & Bert A. Rockman eds., 1996) (observing that "1994 bears many
characteristics of an old-style partisan critical realignment"); see also WALTER D.
BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 135
(1970) (evaluating the argument that the "country is now in a realigning sequence...
[which is a] product of dynamic transformation in a quite separately developing
socioeconomic system"); V.0. Key, Jr., A Theory of Critical Elections, 17J. POL. 3, 3-4
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As a result, the debates over whether the president is strong or
weak, and whether his power should be increased or limited, have
focused invariably on legal, structural, and political changes that
would either vest or reduce personal presidential authority. On the
one side, those who argue that the president is too strong tend to
support expanded congressional oversight of the White House,
limited use of the presidential veto, increased autonomy of the
executive branch bureaucracy, and increased access for Congress
and the press to government documents and deliberations under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),1° Government in the
Sunshine Act (GSA)," and Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA).' 2 On the other side, those who perceive the president as
too weak usually call for a more "unitary executive." These
proponents tend to support the enactment of a law authorizing a
(1955) (formulating "a concept of one type of election-based on American experience
... in which the depth and intensity of electoral involvement are high, in which more
or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of power within the community,
and in which new and durable electoral groupings are formed"). For a legal
application, see generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 266-322 (1991). In
such situations, heightened informal political forces may have a greater impact on
decisions than the legal or political structure through which they are made.
10 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
11 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(14), 552b, 556(d), 557(d) (1994).
12 5 U.S.C. app. (1994); see also MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, TOP
SECRET: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOw 39 (1977) ("IT]he prevailing
system of disclosure [about matters concerning national security], while intrinsically
capable both of assisting public debate and of harming national security, is primarily
oriented toward the parochial needs of members of the executive branch."); Alan B.
Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking. The Wrong Way to Write a
Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1059-60 (1986) (arguing that the OMB's
"dominance under the present system is unwarranted" and that until Congress
"eliminate[s the] OMB's involvement in the rulemaking process... the President...
should impose restrictions on [the] OMB that eliminate the worst abuses"); Peter
Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the Commander in Chief,
80 VA. L. REV. 833, 929-32 (1994) (criticizing Congress for granting control over
national security information to the president); Morton Rosenberg, Congress's
Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan
Administration's Theoy of the Unitary Executive, 57 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 627,672 (1989)
(describing the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services, 433 U.S. 425, 445 (1977), which noted that FOIA and GSA were constitu-
tional regulations of the executive branch); Note, Keeping Secrets: Congress, the Courts,
and National Security Information, 103 HARV. L. REV. 906, 914-17 (1990) (arguing that
FOIA should be rigorously applied to the president in the areas of national security
and foreign policy). See generally Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power Office of
Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under
Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA.J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1 (1984) (finding that executive
oversight of agency decisions via the OMB creates interagency friction and thus
diminishes agency effectiveness).
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line-item veto, expansion of presidential supervisory powers over
the bureaucracy through executive orders such as 12,291," s
12,498,14 and 12,866,'" elimination of the independence of inde-
pendent agencies, expansion of the executive privilege doctrine, and
greater insulation of the president from public scrutiny under FOIA
and FACA.' 0 As the breadth of this list indicates, resolution of
most legal issues regarding the powers of the presidency turns on
whether one views the president as either too strong or too weak.
1 7
Both sides seem to agree, however, that increasing the centralization
of power in the person of the president, both legally and politically,
will significantly increase his influence.'
8
13 3 C.F.R. 127, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1982) (establishing a task force,
among other things, to increase the efficiency and executive oversight of the
regulatory process), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1994).
14 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735
(1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1994).
's 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1994).
'6 See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management ofAgency Rulemaking, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 533, 588 (1989) (arguing for some exemptions for the president from
the review of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in order to further
effective policy control);Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and
the Federal Advisoty Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51, 54 (1994) (arguing that FACA
violates the separation of powers by limiting the president's information-gathering
abilities); DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1081 (defending White House review
of all proposed and final regulations promulgated by executive agencies and arguing
that "rulemakers should be accountable to the president before issuing their rules and
should be obliged to demonstrate the costs and benefits of their rules as thoroughly
as circumstances permit");J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item
Veto: A Reply to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 437 (1990) (arguing that the
item veto may be necessary to preserve the president's position in the constitutional
balance of powers); Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 185-88 (arguing in favor of
executive oversight through Executive Order No. 12,291).
1 This assumption is illuminated by the controversy over the special counsel law,
which captures virtually all of the ideological cross-currents in Washington today. See
generally TERRY EASTLAND, ETHICS, POLITICS, AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL:
EXECUTIVE POWER, EXECUTIVE VICE, 1789-1989 (1989) (providing an historical
account of and argument against the independent counsel law). Opponents, most
notably Justice Scalia in his dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988)
(Scalia,J., dissenting), argue that the special counsel law tips the balance against the
president in political confrontations with the legislative branch and passes effective,
although not formal, control of various traditional executive functions to legislative
officials. Conversely, supporters see the special counsel law as an effective means of
reigning in the improper exercise of power by the president and his high officials by
investigating their compliance with criminal and ethical standards. For a review of
the various positions, see A Symposium on Morrison v. Olson: Addressing the
Constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Statute, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 255 (1989).
" See e.g., David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SuP.
CT. REV. 19, 31-32 (explaining that the framers of Article II "concentrate[d] executive
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This Article takes issue with some important elements of this
analysis. I argue that the structural changes that appear to enhance
the power of the president under public choice approaches and
unitary executive principles can, at the same time, actually under-
mine the president's reputation, his ability to resolve conflicts, and
ultimately, his political strength. As a result, formal attempts to
strengthen the presidency may have "diminishing marginal returns"
and perhaps even negative effects, at least in some contexts. The
reasons are complicated but straightforward: the individuality,
centrality, and visibility of the "personal unitary presidency," which
is seen as an advantage in terms of collective choice and public
debate, can be a disadvantage when it comes to conflict resolution
and public assessment. By using the term "mediating conflict," I
refer to the way in which a political leader or institution overcomes
the social and political costs of resolving distributional and
symbolic disputes. 9 Due to his singularity and enhanced visibility,
power in the hands of a single person" because they believed that a unitary executive
would provide the most effective leadership); Fitts & Inman, supra note 8, at 1757-73
(showing "how informal presidential resources might be used to fashion presidential
coalitions from initially reluctant legislators" and "how the influence of these informal
coalitions can be leveraged through the formal powers of the presidential veto to
induce even major fiscal reforms"); Inman & Fitts, supra note 5, at 96-99 (describing
how strong, independent presidents are able to exercise control over congressional
fiscal policy); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 93-95 (1994) (asserting that a unitary presidency is needed to
counter factionalism among the administrative agencies and increase accountability
in the executive branch);Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should
Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 81, 95 (1985) (arguing that
delegating "political authority to administrators" will improve "the responsiveness of
government to the desires of the electorate" through the responsiveness of the
president overseeing the bureaucracy); Geoffrey Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986
Sup. CT. REV. 41, 47-48 (describing the Reagan Administration's opposition to
independent agencies based on the belief that they limited the power of the
president); Terry M. Moe, Presidents, Institutions, and Theoy, in RESEARCHING THE
PRESIDENCY: VITAL QUESTIONS, NEW APPROACHES, supra note 8, at 337, 364
(describing the president's "quest for control" as characterized by "a great deal of
autonomy" and "freedom to fashion his own agenda and to pursue his own brand of
control").
iS Generally, there is no "pareto" solution to distributional disputes. See Robert
Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 18, 28 (1982) (evaluating the
bargaining interpretation of both the Coase theorem and the Hobbes theorem and
determining that both are "illuminating falsehoods"); see also infra part II.A
(explaining that the developing literature in game theory has shown that "there are
no clear 'pareto superior' solutions or even clear outcomes to most decisions with
pure distributional or symbolic effects"). The mediation process can avoid conflict
in various ways-by changing public values or "preferences," avoiding issues, or
reaching ex ante agreement on formal or informal mediating processes.
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a unitary, centralized president may be less able to mediate many of
these conflicts. At the same time, he may be politically evaluated
more often under personal (rather than institutional) criteria and
subjected to an overassessment of government responsibility and
error. This combination of effects can undermine not only the
popularity and perceived competence-what I will call "legitimacy"-
of the person who holds the office, but indirectly, the president's
political influence as well. What the institution of the presi-
dency seems to gain in strategic power from its centralization in
a single visible individual, it may lose, at least in some contexts,
as a result of the normative political standards applied to indivi-
duals.
This analysis is intended to explain a paradox in the current
debate. Many commentators suggest that the presidency has
become more centralized both legally and politically in recent years,
as the president and his bureaucratic alter ego, the Executive Office
of the President, have become more involved formally and infor-
mally in public policy decisions.2" At the same time, some commen-
tators, led by Theodore Lowi, have persuasively detailed the political
weaknesses and perceived inadequacies of modern presidents.
21
How can these observations be reconciled?22 Extending Lowi's
analysis, I argue that while the presidency may have become a more
complex and effective institution bureaucratically and legally, in
many ways it has also become more individualized politically, which
can undermine its political legitimacy and strength. The legal
theory of the unitary executive, for which I have some sympathy,
can thus be at war with itself.
21 See infra part L.A (discussing the "nature of the presidency in a modern state").
21 See Lowi, supra note 2, at 211 (criticizing the office of the president and
explaining that recent presidents "have been diminished by having to achieve so much
more than past presidents and by having to use so much more deception to
compensate for their failures"); see also GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, PRESIDENTIAL
APPROVAL: A SOURCEBOOK 128-30 (1990) (finding that average presidential approval
ratings have dropped since 1965).
' Indeed, there does not seem to be any systemic relationship between changes
in the structure of the presidency that are viewed as strengthening the power and
influence of the office and the historical perceptions of the strength of individual
presidents. See Inman & Fitts, supra note 5, at 104-05 (referring to a survey of 571
American historians as to the relative strength of each president according to the
"'strength of the role of the president played in directing the government and shaping
the events of his day'"). The strategic advantages of the presidency can only mark the
beginning, not the end, of any institutional analysis. Standing alone, these advantages
seem to suggest that the president is always more powerful than a multimember body
such as Congress-a conclusion clearly not supported by the facts.
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What are the implications of this analysis? First, legal scholars
should appreciate the theoretical complexity of the problem. The
debate over whether the president is too strong or too weak is
in some cases a false dichotomy because the various legal and
political changes serving to centralize formal and informal presiden-
tial resources may increase presidential influence in some contexts
and diminish it in others.2" Indeed, although a more central,
unitary president may be stronger overall, he may nevertheless be
perceived as less competent. In this sense, one important goal
of this Article is to explore how the source of at least some of our
frustration with the office of the presidency is the result of the
structure of the position, rather than the personal "mistakes" of its
inhabitants.
The second purpose of this Article, though far more speculative,
is policy oriented: to suggest possible legal reforms and tactical
approaches modern presidents could follow. Can structural
mechanisms or approaches be developed that help the chief
executive, when appropriate, mediate conflict and avoid certain
types of individualized scrutiny? In the past, old-style political
parties often filled this role,24 but we are unlikely to return to that
era.25 In the alternative, I offer several legal, structural, and
political changes that might improve the president's ability to
mediate conflict, including (paradoxically) reassessment of the line-
item veto, selected cutbacks in direct presidential oversight of
agencies, and the judicious creation of commissions, such as the
Commission on Base Realignment and Closure,2" which operate
' As president after president receives similar criticisms, commentators need to
appreciate that at least some of the failure is due to the nature of the office, not the
person who inhabits it.
24 That is, they served as an institutionalized system for conflict resolution.
25 Whether parties are getting stronger or weaker organizationally, and in what
form, is subject to intense debate. Most observers seem to agree, however, that the
strength of the public's party identification and the impact of parties across the
branches of government are diminishing. SeeJOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? 296
(1995) (explaining that the contemporary party is "candidate-centered," "designed by
and meant to serve its office seekers," and "was intended to transform the conditions
of party government into a reasonable approximation of that party government in
practice").
2' Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-526, § 203, 102 Stat. 2623, 2627-28 (1988) (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 2687 note (1994)) (describing the Commission's composition and its duty to
recommend base closures); Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-510, §§ 2902-2903, 104 Stat. 1485, 1808-12 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2687
note (1994)) (establishing a new Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
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with less direct presidential control.
Part I describes the different ways in which the modern
presidency has become more centralized legally and politically,
making the office more visible and politically accountable. Under
the analyses developed separately in the legal literature on the
unitary presidency and in the political science literature on a
centralized "modern" or "plebiscitary" presidency, these develop-
ments would seem to make the presidency a more effective and
democratic institution. These writings, while focusing on different
substantive areas, share common theoretical perspectives on the
value of increasing centralized presidential power.
Despite these structural developments, the modern presidency
does not seem to be a particularly strong institution. Parts II
through V offer several possible theoretical explanations, exploring,
from a general perspective, the different ways in which the
president's visibility and centralization may, at the same time,
delegitimate politically his exercise of governmental power.
Specifically, increased visibility and centralization may diminish the
president's ability to mediate conflict (Part II), subject him to an
instrumentally inappropriate standard of personal moral evaluation
(Part III), result in an overassessment of personal presidential error
(Part IV), and lead to an overassessment of the president's responsi-
bility for government and social outcomes (Part V). Although these
potential consequences are powerfully affected by cultural percep-
tions and vary in importance according to context, taken together
they can help explain many of the difficulties faced by a more
visible and centralized modern presidency. At the same time, these
generic effects serve to undermine some of the common analytic
assumptions underlying the legal and public choice analyses of a
unitary, centralized presidency. My point is not that a modern
centralized presidency is overall weaker as a result of the changes (it
probably is not), but only that the relationship between greater
centralized authority and overall influence can be quite mixed.
Finally, in the Conclusion, this Article explores specifically how we
might alleviate some of these negative consequences through both
legal and political changes.
In entering the legal and policy debate over the presidency,
this Article reflects two rather distinct approaches. First, it focuses
on the informal political consequences of legal structure, especially
and providing procedures for member selection and closure recommendations).
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mediating political conflict and assessing error. Given the height-
ened visibility of and information about political actors, these
informal consequences may be becoming more important in
understanding the influence of the president." Yet, as explained
below, scholars writing in both the unitary president and public
choice traditions often deemphasize the importance of these two
informal effects. This is perhaps because public choice scholars
operate under the assumption that "preferences" are given,28 while
legal academics tend to overlook the systemic impact of formal
legal authority on informal political power. 9 Although I will rely in
many places on public choice and legal analysis, this Article is a
work of mid-level analysis. I seek to integrate the insights of
the rational choice tradition with more textured claims about
political psychology, information asymmetries, and American
culture.
2 As economists might conceptualize the point, the institutional allocations of
political responsibility--the "property rights"-may become less important when
informal political forces-reduced transaction costs-loom larger. At the same time,
public choice scholars have a great deal of difficulty explaining why the president is
influential in terms of the veto power alone. See Miller, supra note 8, at 296-303
(summarizing literature on formal analysis of the veto power and finding that a
president cannot rely solely on his veto power to achieve legislative success).
2 Making political or distributional decisions (that is, mediating conflict)
necessarily requires "changing" preferences about distribution-inducing participants
to accept a distribution that makes them worse off than their ideal. Unlike the case
of private markets, where losers go away, in governmental conflicts losers can retaliate
or refuse to participate. To put this in law and economics terms, political systems
must deal with distributional questions for which there is no pareto solution and for
which serious strategic and other costs may exist. See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM,
POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 78-81 (1977)
(describing the circumstances under which there is no pareto (or "no-loss-to-anyone")
solution); ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 187 (concluding that "the market cannot
bear the entire burden of managing conflict" and that "[p]olitical institutions and
decisionmaking procedures are required for decisions that can only be made
collectively"); Cooter, supra note 19, at 14-24 (describing the problems of applying the
Coase theorem to the bargaining process); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
The Political Economy of Federalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE (Dennis
Mueller ed., forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 9, on file with author) (describing the
" well known" fact "that the division of any economic pie is a bargaining problem
which may have no solution").
' At the same time, this Article serves to elucidate some long-lasting debates in
political science about the benefits of political parties as opposed to presidents.
Presidential systems appear to be ideal decisionmaking institutions under many public
choice models but have been criticized by many traditional political scientists. See
e.g., AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS
GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIES 76 (1984) (recognizing that "the respective
independence" of the executive and legislative branches "creates the potential of
serious disagreements and deadlock between them").
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Second, to understand the effects of these informal factors on
the power of the presidency, this Article adopts a fairly abstract
approach. References to individual presidents, which I plan to
develop further in a future article, are offered primarily for
illustrative purposes. This method contrasts with many political
science pieces on the presidency that seek to explain the strength
of the institution in terms of individual personalities or styles.
These "great person" theories are rich in detail but offer no analysis
that can be usefully generalized or evaluated. 0 Legal studies, on
the other hand, tend to engage in a formal doctrinal analysis but
ignore informal political factors or fail to incorporate them
systematically into their formal analysis."1 If one broadens the
analysis of the presidency to include these informal perspectives,
however, the political singularity of the president-viewed positively
under public choice models of collective action and unitary
president proposals-emerges as a potential source of his weak-
ness.
3 2
"See Colin Campbell, Political Executives and Their Officials, in 2 POLITICAL
SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 383, 384 (Ada W. Finifter ed., 1993)
("[P]olitical scientists have tended to extrapolate from the approach and circum-
stances of each administration in making more general assertions about the state of
the presidency which soon fail the test of time."); Terry M. Moe, Presidential Style
and Presidential Theory (1990) (unpublished manuscript) (criticizing such studies as
"promoting conceptual confusion, the endless proliferation of relevant variables, and
more complications than any analysis can make sense of"), quoted in Campbell, supra,
at 383.
"' The most notable exception is Steven Calabresi's recent article. See Steven G.
Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitaty Executive, 48 ARK. L. REv. 23, 29
(1995).
12 A final note: Due to the nature of the topic, the thesis is difficult to "test" in
any rigorous empirical sense. There are only a small number of "observations" (that
is, presidents) to which this or any other analysis of the presidency can be applied.
Furthermore, the criteria used are necessarily imprecise. In order to minimize this
concern, the explanation is presented in logical and general terms, so that it can be
evaluated on its own merits and applied in different cases. See generally MAX WEBER,
THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1949) (exploring the difficulty of causal
proof in the social sciences).
Its generalizability should also serve to eliminate at least some of the political
bias that clouds many analyses of the presidency. Writing in this area frequently
occurs in the "heat of battle." Is Ronald Reagan acting "tyrannically" when he mines
the harbors of Nicaragua? Is Bill Clinton being highhanded when he attempts to
dictate health care reforms? In this regard, this Article appears at a relatively
receptive historical moment. Our recent memory of presidents includes both a
"Clinton" and a "Reagan," health care as well as tax cuts, and Haiti as well as
Nicaragua.
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I. THE PRESIDENCY
A. The Modern Presidency
What is the nature of the presidency in the modern state?
Numerous political scientists and legal academics claim that our
recent chief executives have inherited a "modern presidency,"3
which began to develop with Franklin Roosevelt and is structurally
distinct from earlier regimes.3 4 Of course, the balance of power
among the president, Congress, and the agencies is exceedingly
complex, since the amount of bureaucratic activity and legislative
oversight has increased greatly over the years. Nevertheless, "the
resources of modern presidents [are thought by many to] dwarf
those of their predecessors." 5  Commentators point to three
related changes that centralize greater formal power in the
institution and increase the informal political assets at the presi-
dent's command.
The first change, which is to some extent considered the most
important and defining quality of the modern presidency, is the
increased visibility of the president as an individual within the
electoral process. Prior to the Roosevelt Administration, the
president was viewed more as a member of both a party and a
complicated and elite system of government. He was also relatively
distant from the population. The modern presidents, in contrast,
are elected increasingly as individuals in the primary and general
elections on the basis of direct public exposure in the media. This
s The modern presidency perspective has been developed in THOMAS C. CRONIN,
THE STATE OF THE PRESIDENCY (1980); SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC (2d ed.
1993); NEUSTADT, supra note 1; RICHARD ROSE, THE POSTMODERN PRESIDENT: THE
WHITE HOUSE MEETS THE WORLD (1988); Fred Greenstein, Continuity and Change in
the Modem Presidency, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 45 (Anthony Kink
ed., 1979). The original "modern presidency" book was CLINTON ROSSrER, THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (1956). The major challenge to the concept of a distinctive
modern presidency is found in STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE
(1993). Skowronek suggests that enduring patterns of presidential conflicts exist by
which different types of presidents throughout American history can be categorized.
Even Skowronek, however, believes that recent presidents may have experienced a
waning of political time. See id. at 55-56.
s' Most scholars trace the beginning of the modern presidency to Roosevelt and
the New Deal. See, e.g., LOWI, supra note 2, at 8 ("One of the most important changes
attributable to the New Deal is the change in President-Congress relations."). See
generally SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIES (1993) (tracing, since the
New Deal, the transformation of the American party system, specifically the
relationship between the presidency and party politics).
3- SKOWRONEK, supra note 33, at 409.
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evolution, which has occurred over a number of years, is a result of
social forces, such as the decline of political parties36 and the rise
of the media, as well as legal changes, such as the ascendancy of
primaries. s
Second, once in power, modern presidents have increasingly
attempted to take greater formal and informal control of the
executive branch, through policy expansion of the OMB and the
Executive Office of the President and increased oversight of
agencies under Executive Order 12,2918 and its successor orders.
Indeed, every president since Roosevelt has attempted to centralize
power in the White House to oversee the operations of the
executive branch and to make its resources more responsive to his
policy and political needs.
39
36 See generally MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
PARTIES 1952-1984 (1986).
37 SeeJAMES W. CEASER, REFORMING THE REFORMS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS 32-33,58-64 (1982) (showing the "dramatic growth
in the number of primaries since 1968 and in the number of delegates chosen in
primaries" and discussing the concomitant increase in media influence); NELSON W.
POLSBY, CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY REFORM 56, 69, 132 (1983) (noting that a series of
party reforms generated a proliferation of primaries, a vast increase in the role of the
news media, and a reevaluation of what the idea of a political party meant). Changes
in the structure of party nominations have contributed to the process of enhancing
the centrality of the candidates and the president as a person. For public choice
analysis of the impact of primary changes, see JOHN H. ALDRICH, BEFORE THE
CONVENTION: STRATEGIES AND CHOICES IN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION CAMPAIGNS
114 (1980); LARRY M. BARTELS, PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND THE DYNAMICS OF
PUBLIC CHOICE 17-27 (1988). Likewise, the party primary process highlights the
individual qualities of candidates and makes campaigns candidate-centered. Once
elected, therefore, the president cannot rely as much on party members to diffuse
conflict and maintain support; he becomes a truly personal president. See MARTIN P.
WATTENBERC, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED POLITICS 164 (1991) ("Without a
solid base of continuing partisan support, presidential candidate popularity has...
shown long-term decline.").
s 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735
(1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1994).
" See, e.g., Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994)) (outlining the president's functions
with respect to the national budget); National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-
253, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 496 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1988 & Supp. V 1993))
(vesting the president with broad powers over national defense); Reorganization Act
of 1939, ch. 36, §§ 1-12, 53 Stat. 561, 561-64 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 701, 1101 (1994)) (giving the president the power to restructure agencies to
reduce government expenditure and increase efficiency). For a general discussion of
modern presidents' increased assertion of power over the bureaucracy, seeJOHN P.
BURKE, THE INSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENCY 24-49 (1992);JOHN HART, THE PRESIDENTIAL
BRANCH (1987) (describing the evolution of the Executive Office of the President
from its beginnings in the Brownlow Report during the Roosevelt Administration to
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Finally, and relatedly, the modern presidency has become more
centralized and personalized through its public media role-that is,
its "rhetorical functions."" Given changes in the press and the
White House office, the president has become far more effective in
setting the agenda for public debate, sometimes even dominating
the public dialogue when he chooses.4 1 Economists would proba-
bly attribute the president's ability to "transmit information" to the
centralized organization of the presidency-an "economy of scale"
in public debate.4 2 At the same time, the president can establish
its modern form in existence during the Reagan Administration); Terry M. Moe, The
Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 235, 239 (John
E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985) ("[T]he modern president is driven ... to
seek control over the structures and processes of government."); Moe, supra note 18,
at 371 (noting that "all modern presidents have rightly feared becoming captives of
the bureaus and departments, and [as a result] they have incrementally moved toward
the development of White House structures."); cf. THEODORE J. LOWl & BENJAMIN
GINSBERG, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 244 (1990) (noting that "after F.D.R.... every
president was strong whether he was committed to the strong presidency or not");
RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY 13 (1983) (arguing that the
president can exercise significant power independent of Congress through his control
over the bureaucracy). For an analysis of how modern presidents, starting with
Roosevelt, have increasingly used the bureaucracy as an independent political base,
see generally MILKIS, supra note 34.40 TULiS, supra note 2, at 4.
41 On the importance of the president's public role to his power, see KERNELL,
supra note 33, at 55-114 (discussing the trend of recent presidents to "go public");
NEUSTADT, supra note 1, at 64-79 (discussing the role of the president's "public
prestige"); Richard E. Neustadt, The Clerk Against the Preacher, in PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 33 (James S. Young ed., 1982) (discussing
President Carter's attempts to "show himself outside Washington and to get local
coverage outside the network news"). On the importance of public perceptions of the
president to his influence in Washington, see GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, AT THE
MARGINS: PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP OF CONGRESS 101-25 (1989) (explaining the
relationship between the president's public approval and his success in Congress);
Terry Sullivan, Presidential Leadership in Congress, in CONGRESS, STRUCTURE, AND
POLICY 286-308 (Matthew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987) (hypothesizing
that the president's public approval will positively affect the likelihood that members
of Congress will commit to the position of the president).
42 See Miller, supra note 8, at 311 ("The president's most important source of
power is that he, almost alone in the United States, has the ability to gain immediate
and complete access to the flow of free information. He therefore has the potential
to be the most powerful issue entrepreneur in the country."). But seeJohn H. Fund,
We Are All Pundits Now, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1994, at A22 (noting that a "few
gatekeepers [the traditional national news media] no longer have the power to control
the flow of information" but that "the parameters of the debate" are now being set
by cable television, talk radio, and alternative information networks such as computer
bulletin boards). Similar forces may be leading prime ministers in parliamentary
systems in the same direction. See PATRICK WELLER, FIRST AMONG EQUALS: PRIME
MINISTERS IN WESTMINSTER SYSTEMS 180 (1985) ("Domestically and internationally
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a "focal point" around preferred public policies.
43
This proposition can also be stated somewhat differently. As an
institution embodied in a single individual, the president has a
unique ability to "tell" a simple story that is quite personal and
understandable to the public. As a number of legal academics have
shown, stories can be a powerful mode for capturing the essence of
a person's situated perspective, improving public comprehension of
particular facts, and synthesizing complex events into accessible
language. 44 Complex institutions, such as Congress, have difficulty
[prime ministers] speak for their nation, their government and their party. They
appear frequently on the media, explaining and defending their actions, attacking
their opponents and appealing to the voters for support.").
4
3 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57 (1980) (explaining
the concept of a focal point as a "clue for coordinating behavior," the determination
of which is a key strategy in any type of bargaining or negotiating situation); Fitts &
Inman, supra note 8, at 1757-60 (describing the public media as an important
presidential resource in establishing focal points and overcoming universalism in
Congress); see also Miller, supra note 8, at 317, 322 (arguing that the "presidency has
a unique role in American politics as the focal point of coordination" and a "special
ability to overcome rational ignorance in the general public, creating the potential for
mass mobilization on an issue that sparks the great changes in American politics").
44 See, e.g., HOWARD GARDNER, LEADING MINDS: AN ANATOMY OF LEADERSHIP 14
(1995) (asserting that the "ultimate impact of the leader depends most significantly
on the particular story that he or she relates or embodies, and the receptions to that
story on the part of audiences"); see also Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling
Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 820-22 (1993)
(noting that cognitive psychology literature links storytelling to practical reasoning,
a frequently used method in decisionmaking processes); Steven L. Winter, The
Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2225, 2276-77 (1989) (noting that narratives are more attractive because they
correspond more closely to the manner in which the human mind makes sense of
experience than does the conventional rhetoric of law). See generally Robert M.
Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1983) (describing the historical role of the narrative in understanding the law
of our normative world, from biblical times to today's interpretation of the Constitu-
tion). As such, stories may be an effective means of organizing a mass of information,
given the cognitive limitations of human beings and the infinity of potentially relevant
facts. See JOHN R. ANDERSON, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATiONS 158
(1980); Martin Davies, Reading Cases, 50 MOD. L. REV. 409,427-31 (1987) (noting that
the familiarity of the language used in a narrative makes it easier for a listener to
understand the message in terms of his store of relevant contexts, or his "cultural
generator"). Institutions may be incapable ofarticulating such stories. Members of
Congress can try, but presidents are probably in the structurally best position. For
a discussion of this factual issue in the trial context, see Ronald J. Allen, Factual
Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 604, 604-05 (1994) (attributing
the "contemporary shift of focus ... from deciding the truth or falsity of particular
elements to deciding the relative plausibility of opposing stories" to the realization
that jurors think in narrative terms rather than in terms of preponderance of
evidence). See generally Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory ofJuror
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assembling and transmitting information as part of a coherent
whole; they represent a diversity-some would say a babble-of voices
and perspectives. In contrast, presidents have the capacity to
project a coherent and empathetic message, especially if it is tied to
their own life stories. In this sense, the skill of the president in
telling a story about policy, while sometimes a source of pointed
criticism for its necessary simplicity,4 5 may greatly facilitate public
understanding and acceptance of policy.46
B. The Theory of the Unitary Presidency
This picture of the modern presidency is quite consistent with
those parts of the legal and political science literatures exploring the
advantages of presidential (as opposed to legislative) power and
advocating a more unitary or centralized presidency. According to
this view," power and accountability in government and in the
executive branch should be moved more toward the top, giving the
Decision Making: The Story Mode4 13 CARDOzO L. REV. 519 (1991) (theorizing that
jurors impose a narrative organization on evidence, based upon their own life
experiences, in order to more easily understand the information).
45 See e.g., LowI, supra note 2, at 12 (criticizing the rhetorical presidency for its
simplicity, and specifically its ability to use "planned appearances" to put "issues and
criticisms in a better light" and "creat[e] the appearance of success"); TuiuS, supra
note 2, at 179 (stating that "the rhetorical presidency enhances the tendency to define
issues in terms of the needs of persuasion rather than to develop a discourse suitable
for the illumination and exploration of real issues").
4 See Lawrence R. Jacobs & Robert Y. Shapiro, Issues, Candidate Image, and
Priming. The Use of Private Polls in Kennedy's 1960 Presidential Campaign, 88 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 527, 535-36 (1994) (outlining the political advantages of tying a candidate's
personality to particular policy positions).
47 In many respects I might be counted as one of its proponents. See generally Fitts
& Inman, supra note 8 (showing how presidential influence may be used to encourage
positive fiscal reform); Inman & Fitts, supra note 5, at 83-92, 96-99 (measuring the
inefficiency created by endowing power to a decentralized body like Congress and
emphasizing the importance of keeping the power in the unitary executive); cf
Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Impefect Information As a Positive Influence in
Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917, 920-22 (1990) [hereinafter Fitts, Ignorance]
(arguing that in some circumstances, relying on strong, centralized political
institutions to disseminate information to the public can have potential policy effects);
Michael A. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionay Notes on Civic Republicanism,
97 YALE L.J. 1651, 1655-58 (1988) (arguing that the ideals of civic republicanism, as
opposed to strong and centralized political parties, may actually hurt the interests of
minority groups and decrease political participation); Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of
Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1603 (1988) [hereinafter Fitts, Vices] (arguing that "centralized
political systems are thought to enhance majority rule, reduce collective action
problems, and improve the operation of the decisional processes").
846 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144:827
president and his staff greater ability to make decisions themselves
or to leave them, subject to oversight, in the hands of expert agency
officials. In the legal literature, this position is usually associated
with support for strengthening the president's directorial powers
over the agencies, unfettered presidential removal authority, and
Chevron deference to agency regulations 48 reviewed by the White
House. Similarly, political scientists emphasize the plebiscitarian
president's growing informal influence with the agencies and the
public, as well as the association between a strong president and the
"national" interest.4 9
To be sure, legal proponents of a strong unitary presidency
usually do not outline a comprehensive policy defense of the legal
position but rely more on doctrinal justifications and related policy
arguments.5 0 By synthesizing and integrating the interrelated legal
and policy rationales in the legal and political science literatures,
however, one can sketch the outlines of a common theory. This
analysis suggests that the structure of a more unitary, centralized
presidency should enhance the power, legitimacy, and effectiveness
of the office, especially as compared to Congress, in three different
but related ways.
48 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984) (articulating the deferential standard for judicial review of the
actions and decisions of administrative agencies); see also Michael Herz, Imposing
Unified Executive Branch Statutoy Interpretation, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 219, 251 (1993)
(arguing for centralized executive oversight of agencies' statutory interpretations).
49 See, e.g., GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER & AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 367-68
(1967) (prescribing a stronger party system, presidency, and national government as
ways to create a national constituency, thus serving the public interest and operating
as an antidote to the American tradition of small constituencies); MANCUR OLSON,
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL
RIGIDITIES 51 (1982) (discussing the observations of political scientists that national
policies would improve if party leadership were stronger in discipline and accountabil-
ity).
50 For the most part, the legal literature on the unitary executive does not usually
present a comprehensive policy defense. Rather, most analyses combine the textual
language and original intent of the Constitution with related citation to policy
rationales. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power
to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 548-50 (1994) (relying on the text of the
Constitution, its legislative history, and general historical evidence to support their
theory of the unitary executive); Steven C. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitay Executive Plural Judiciay, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153,
1165-68 (1992) (summarizing the arguments of unitary executive theorists as wholly
relying on Article II to support their claims that the president should have broad
powers of control over the executive department). The major exception is Professor
Calabresi's recent normative piece on the presidency. See Calabresi, supra note 31,
at 29 (outlining a normative defense of the unitary presidency).
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First, with respect to the administration of the executive branch,
centralized power, or at least the opportunity for the exercise of
centralized power, is thought to facilitate better development and
coordination of national programs and policies. Because federal
government programs interrelate in countless ways, a centralized
figure or institution such as the president is seemingly in a good
position to recognize and respond to the demands of the overall
situation.5 ' For similar reasons, as social and political change
accelerates, the president may be well-situated to foresee and
implement adaptive synoptic changes-that is, to engage in strategic
planning. One of the rationales for the existence of the federal
government is the national effect of its policies, which under this
view can be reconciled most easily at the top.5 2 To the extent that
the president is successful in putting together such programs, he
should receive political credit, which would redound to his political
strength.5
Second, centralized power facilitates greaterpoliticalaccountabili-
ty by placing in one single individual the public's focus of govern-
ment performance. If the public had to evaluate electorally the
activities of hundreds of different officials in the executive branch,
its information about the positions, actions, and effects of govern-
ment behavior would be extraordinarily limited.5 4 Only those most
" See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management; Contro4 and the Dilemmas of Presidential
Leadership in the Modem Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1193-96 (1994)
(noting that a unitary executive has an advantage over Congress in formulating policy
because the presidency is more efficient and is politically accountable to a broader
and much less organized constituency, which helps him withstand the pressures that
interest groups exert on politicians who have smaller constituencies); Strauss &
Sunstein, supra note 7, at 189 (noting that "the [p]resident is in a good position to
centralize and coordinate the regulatory process"); cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 427-
28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("But the multiplication of the
executive adds to the difficulty of detection.... It often becomes impossible, amidst
mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a
pernicious measure ... ought really to fall.").
52 See WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 145-51
(1964) (explaining why national decisionmaking can be more efficient than local
decisionmaking); cf Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 28, at 6-10 (explaining why
confederate republics may be inefficient).
" See Fitts & Inman, supra note 8, at 1771-73 (explaining how the president can
benefit politically by using his coalition-building power to achieve major reforms).
54 See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, STRUCTURAL REFORM OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET
PROCESS 6 (1973) (noting that in the budget context, the acquisition of information
is difficult and expensive and that people therefore operate in "rational ignorance").
See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 51, at 479 ("The Executive power is
more easily confined when it is one since there is a single objective for the jealousy
and watchfulness of the people.").
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interested in a particular function would be likely to have informa-
tion about its behavior or attempt to influence that behavior
through election, lobbying, or litigation. This is the standard
concern with New Deal agencies captured by the so-called iron
triangle of Washington politics.55 By contrast, placing overall
political responsibility in one individual is thought to facilitate
broader political accountability. While this oversight can have
mixed effects depending on presidential performance, it has the
potential for strengthening the president's political support and
influence.5 Because he is more likely to approximate the views of
the median voter,5 a unitary president is thought to enjoy a clear
majoritarian mandate, as the only elected representative of all
"The People." This democratic legitimacy should be, in turn, a
major source of his political strength.58 As one commentator has
55 SeeMARVERH. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
3-4, 217 (1977) (describing and analyzing the view "that commissions are influenced
excessively by the groups subject to regulation and are too easily molded into
instruments to protect private interests"); OLSON, supra note 49, at 50-52 (arguing
that members of Congress are affected to a greater extent by the lobbying of special
interest groups than the president is because interest groups find it more rational to
exert pressure on Congress, whose members are accountable to smaller constituen-
cies).
' See Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 207, 233 (1984) ("[C]entralized review of regulation can help the [p]resident
check policy that may result from agency alliances with congressional committees or
interest groups, enhancing his power against those forces."); Lessig & Sunstein, supra
note 18, at 97-99 (noting that with the expansion of the New Deal, the president
needed to counter factionalism and increase the accountability of government
officers); Mashaw, supra note 18, at 95-99 (arguing that delegation of congressional
authority to executive agencies is desirable because voters elect presidents for their
broad policy goals and presidents can thus be held accountable for agencies'
implementation of those goals); Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 189-90
(describing the efficiency advantages of greater presidential control over the
regulatory process); M. Stephen Weatherford, An Economic Theory of Democracy As a
Theory of Policy, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION AND CHOICE: AN ECONOMIC THEORY
OF DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE 209,220-22 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1993) (noting that
an appeal by the president for a common commitment to national legislation can
outweigh the more narrowly defined interests of legislators).
"' For the original discussion of how political institutions can be structured to
respond to the median voter, see ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY 297 (1957) (discussing a rational-choice model of voting decisions and
candidates' political positions and arguing that a two-party system will seek out "issues
that a majority of citizens strongly favor").
8 See EDWARDS, supra note 41, at 101-25, 144-66 (finding that a president must
rely increasingly on direct public support for policy determinations as national party
organizations deteriorate, special interest groups proliferate, and congressional party
discipline erodes). In law and economics terms, a unitary presidency is thus a better
and less costly "brand name." See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of
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argued: "Every deviation from the principle of executive unitariness
will necessarily undermine the national majority electoral coali-
tion."59
Finally, on an elite political level, the existence of a single
powerful political actor serves a political coordination function.6' A
dispersed government with a decentralized political structure has a
great deal of difficulty in reaching cooperative solutions on policy
outcomes. Even if it does reach cooperative solutions, it has great
difficulty in reaching optimal results. Today, there are simply too
many groups in Washington and within the political elite to reach
the necessary and optimal agreement easily." A central and visible
figure such as the president, who can take clear positions, can serve
as a unique "focal point" for coordinating action.6 2  With the
ability to focus public attention and minimize information costs,63
Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. EcON. 615, 616, 626-33
(1981) (discussing the importance of "reputations" and brand names as private
devices that assure contract performance in the absence of any third-party enforcer).
For a discussion of the value of brand names in the institutional context, see David
M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theoy, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE
PoLITICAL ECONOMY 90, 106-11 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990).
" Calabresi, supra note 31, at 66.
60 See Fitts & Inman, supra note 8, at 1738-39, 1755-73 (arguing that through the
strategic use of informal resources and formal veto powers, the president can "fashion
a legislative strategy of coalition building and position taking that draws all members
of Congress into supporting an efficient fiscal outcome").
61 For discussion of how informal information networks can serve to further
efficient and cooperative solutions, see Robert Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE
LJ. 1315, 1320-21 (1993) (arguing that "groups are conducive to cooperation" when
they provide members "with both the information and opportunity.., to engage in
informal social control"); Kreps, supra note 58, at 124-31 (discussing how the
corporate culture lends itself to efficient decisionmaking through its hierarchical
structure and its open lines of communication); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of
Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 8, on file with author) ("[I]n a well-
functioning group [a collection of people who choose to cooperate], the prisoner's
dilemma either does not exist or exists only at the margin: members (or most
members) cooperate because the payoff from cooperation exceeds the payoff from
defection... ; in other words, cooperation is individually rational.").
62 A "focal point" is a point that "suggests itself" as the outcome for a group of
participants. As such, it can avoid the social costs-including the prospect of strategic
behavior-of reaching a specific agreement. See SCHELLING, supra note 43, at 57-59
(discussing the value of focal points or clues for coordinating group behavior and
suggesting that imagination as well as "caustic logic" may lead individuals to find a
unique or prominent commonality); Miller, supra note 8, at 318.
65 Of course, the proliferation of new media sources outside the mainstream may
diminish this role. See infra note 146 and accompanying text. Yet even with the
ascendancy of Congress and Newt Gingrich during the last year, the media has
continued to focus more attention on the presidency. See Katherine Q. Seelye,
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a president can also be highly effective in overcoming narrow but
powerful sources of opposition and in facilitating communication
(that is, coordination and cooperation) between groups and
branches.' In technical terms, he might be viewed as the "least
cost avoider."6 5 The budget confrontation between Clinton and
Congress is only the most recent example of the president's
strategic abilities. 66  In this regard, it is not surprising that
most studies have found that the president's popularity is an
important factor in his ability to effectively negotiate with Con-
gress.
67
For all of these reasons, many scholars, citizens, and politicians
believe that the development of the rhetorical and centralized
presidency is an "unqualified blessing."6 A president who is
visible should be better able and more likely to garner public
support and should also have an incentive to marshall such support
for programs that respond to public needs. His centralization and
Clinton Edges Congress in Amount of Television Coverage, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
1995, at D24 (citing a study by the Center for Media and Public Affairs that noted
that the Clinton Administration received greater media coverage than Congress
despite the Republicans' aggressive agenda in both the House and Senate).
" As Professor Miller has written:
The president's most important source of power is that he, almost alone in
the United States, has the ability to gain immediate and complete access to
the flow of free information. He therefore has the potential to be the most
powerful issue entrepreneur in the country.... The presiden[t] swamps all
other contenders in his ability to get his ideas across to the public.
Miller, supra note 8, at 311 (emphasis added).
' The unitary presidency literature does not employ this characterization, but I
think that this is the most reasonable interpretation of its analysis.
"See generally Jerry Gray, Battle over the Budget: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
1996, at Al; Eric Pianin & Ann Devroy, Congress Leaves for Recess with Budget
Unresolved, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1995, at Al. For a more detailed example, see Fitts
& Inman, supra note 8, at 1780-84 (discussing Reagan's confrontations with
Congress).
6 7 See NEUSTADT, supra note 1, at 67 (stating that "[t]he weaker [the president's]
apparent popular support, the more ... his opportunities are diminished").
Neustadt's classic study of the modern presidency emphasizes the president's ability
to coordinate bargaining among political elites. With the decline of party control, the
proliferation of interest group elites, and the expansion of the mass media, the
president's coordinating role has become much more public, and probably more
important. See KERNELL, supra note 33, at 13 ("[I]nstitutionalized pluralism promotes
a... process of coalition building.... Presidential coalitions are usually temporary
associations .... ."); id. at 31 (noting that a public address "[e]mployed at the right
moment" may have "dramatic" results for presidential coalition-building).
68 See TULIS, supra note 2, at 12. But see id. at 12-13 (stating that these assump-
tions are incorrect and noting that the rhetorical presidency is a political development
with "considerable systemic costs").
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visibility afford him the power to be effective, but, at the same time,
these qualities increase his democratic accountability. And even
though a modern president is certainly not unitary in the strong
sense of that word, the analogy presumes that future legal and
structural evolution should move in that direction.6 9
Three different scholars of the presidency, writing in diffe-
rent traditions, have reached similar conclusions regarding the
significance and advantages of stronger presidential power,
especially as compared to legislative influence. Presidential scholar
Terry Moe has described the influence of the modern president as
follows:
When it comes to building structures of control... the battle
between president and Congress is lopsided. The president is a
unitary decision maker, he can take unilateral action in imposing
his own structures, his individual interests are largely congruent
with the institutional interests of the presidency, and he is
dedicated to gaining control over government. Congress is
hobbled by collective action problems, vulnerable to agenda
manipulation by the president, and populated by individuals whose
interests diverge substantially from those of the institution. The
result is an asymmetry in the dynamic of institutional change,
yielding an uneven but steady shift toward a more presidential
system.
70
Or, as Professor Gary Miller has written:
[T]he president must compete for and represent those large blocks
of Americans who do not belong to organized interests but who
are concerned about issues such as inflation, tax reform, civil
rights, and deficits. Furthermore, the president derives his
influence in politics from the fact that he alone represents these
latent national constituencies.
... [The president and presidential candidates] are the natural
proponents of cooperative solutions to social dilemmas.7 '
And finally, Professor Steven Calabresi has written, in summarizing
with approval the views of the founding fathers:
Hamilton asserted that a unitary executive would both cause
69 To the extent that the poor performance of government is the result of
information breakdowns and collective action problems, a visible and accountable
presidency would seem to stand as the paradigmatic modern antidote, a modern
political form of enterprise liability. See OLSON, supra note 49, at 50-51.
70 Moe, supra note 18, at 376; see also SUNDQUIST, supra note 2, at 158 (contrasting
the "endemic weakness" of Congress with the growing strength of the presidency).
71 Miller, supra note 8, at 328.
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power and energy to accrue to the office and facilitate public
accountability for and control over how that power and energy
was exercised. Thus, whereas a plural executive would both dilute
executive energy and popular accountability and control, a unitary
executive would lead to the opposite result. Executive energy
would be enhanced and so would the likelihood that it would be
used in conformity with the interests of the nation.
72
Of course, proponents of a unitary executive must recognize
that there will and should be extensive delegation to, and exercise
of authority by, the agencies.73  In some contexts, such as due
process adjudication of individual rights, the Constitution presum-
ably places limitations on direct political presidential intervention
in the agencies.74 Certain agency decisions, such as adjudication
of individual social security benefits, should not be made by the
current political process, at least not on a case-by-case basis. In
other situations, advocates of a unitary presidency also have to
recognize that decentralization promotes a division of labor,
exercise of expertise, and a more incremental process of decision-
making. In such cases, decisions should be made initially at a lower
level by experts within the agencies.75
Under the unitary presidential view, however, most agency
decisions should be subject ultimately to presidential and White
House oversight and political responsibility. The assumption is that
the president generally should be in a principal-agent relationship
with the agencies on issues subject to current political resolution.
76
Calabresi, supra note 31, at 44-45.7' The modern presidency certainly has not centralized all or even most formal
and informal decisionmaking in the person of the president or the executive office
of the president. Countless bureaucratic divisions of labor remain within the modern
executive branch. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 48, at 219 (arguing that there are
different categories of agency decisionmaking and putting forth four possible
categories: adjudication, selection of regulatory strategies, value selection, and
statutory interpretation).
' See A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1346, 1347 (1994) (stating that the relative independence of agencies furthers
the constitutional objective of hindering tyranny); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
573, 622-25 (1984) (describing the limitations on political intervention in agency
adjudications suggested by a separation-of-functions rationale). See Kendall v. United
States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838) (discussing constitutional limitations on
presidential power over subordinate executive officials).
71 See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 1515 (arguing that, in the name of civic
republicanism, agencies should have the discretion to draft broad policies because
their officials have "greater expertise and fewer immediate political pressures than
directly elected officials and legislators").
7' The so-called congressional dominance literature has shown how Congress can
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In other words, the president should be personally visible and
politically accountable for political activities of the executive
branch, 7 even though the actual administration of the branch, as
with any system based on enterprise liability, would have to be
largely delegated."8 To this extent, the story of the modern
presidency would seem to be positive, at least according to the
proponents of the unitary executive and to theories of enterprise
oversee agency activities through an analogous type of fire alarm system. See generally
Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures As Instruments of Political
Control, 3J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 243, 248-49 (1987) (noting how Congress can
enforce its authority over agencies through removal, appropriations, public hearings,
and legislative orders); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166
(1984) (describing one type of congressional oversight of agencies as "fire-alarm
oversight," which is characterized by the establishment of rules and procedures that
allow individual citizens or organized interest groups to examine and question agency
decisions).
' Thus, activities that do not lend themselves to majoritarian political control,
such as due process adjudication, would not be subject to presidential oversight. The
theory of a strong unitary president is that the president should take primary
responsibility for those activities of the executive branch that are conducive to
majoritarian decisionmaking. Responsibilities that lend themselves to the exercise of
greater expertise would be vested initially in the hands of expert agency officials but
would ultimately be subject to political oversight.
The primary opponents of a unitary presidency emphasize the need for the
exercise of nonmajoritarian influence, either in the form of autonomous expert
executive agencies, congressional interest groups, or civic republican elites. See
generally Thomas 0. McGarrity, Presidential Control of Regulatoty Agency Decisionmaking,
36 AM. U. L. REV. 443 (1987) (arguing for more stringent congressional oversight of
presidential control of agency decisions in order to preserve the integrity and
expertise of agencies); Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of
Regulator Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 24-26 (1994) (criticizing presidential control
because it interferes with agency expertise).
7' The theory of a unitary presidency is thus quite consistent with a division of
labor in administration. Borrowing from the principal-agent analysis, the assumption
is that the president retains the ability to oversee and, if he wishes, overrule decisions
of the agencies, even though subordinates within the agencies will make most
decisions. The critical points for the president are to appoint subordinates faithful
to his goals and interests and to ensure the receipt of reliable information about their
activities that are contrary to these interests. In this sense, Executive Orders 12,291,
12,498, and 12,866 each act as a type of "fire alarm" in service of the president rather
than Congress. Thus, the theory of the unitary presidency is consistent with a
bottom-up or incremental theory of decisionmaking. See generally Richard A. Posner,
Legal Reasoning from the Top Down and from the Bottom Up: The Question of
Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 433 (1992) (explaining
that, in bottom-up legal reasoning, "one starts with the words of a statute or other
enactment, or with a case... and moves from there-but doesn't move far"); Cass R.
Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REv. 741, 746 (1993) (stating that,
in analogical reasoning, which is a version of bottom-up thinking, "[ildeas are
developed from the details, rather than imposed on them from above").
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liability.
One final point: This attitude toward more centralized national
power may seem contradictory, given the frequent support of some
proponents of a unitary executive (most notably Justice Scalia) for
more decentralized decisionmaking structures, such as private
economic markets or local government.79 Members of both the
right and the left have argued that local decisionmaking can
facilitate greater participation and accountability, as well as more
consensual decisionmaking 0 While a reconciliation of these views
is beyond the scope of this Article, the presumption in favor of a
more politically centralized federal government seems to be
predicated on the national scope of its spending and taxing
power8 1 and on the difficulty faced by the public in overseeing and
effecting such diverse and complex decisions.5 2 These problems are
7 Compare Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the position of independent counsel "deprive[s] the President of the
United States of exclusive control of" purely executive power) with United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1625 (1995) (Scalia, J., joining majority opinion) (striking
down under the Commerce Clause Congress's attempt to criminalize firearm
possession in school zones). In general, the literature on private markets favors
decentralized structures over monopolistic enterprises, assuming competitive markets
and limited externalities. Some commentators make similar "Tiebout" type
arguments on behalf of federalism. See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 28, at 11-13.
As Elmer E. Schattschneider observed, "the people are powerless if the political
enterprise is not competitive. It is the competition of political organizations that
provides the people with the opportunity to make a choice." E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER,
THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 140
(1960).
o See Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425, 1492-1500
(1987) ("[T]he limited sovereignty of state and federal governments promotes and
vindicates the ultimate sovereignty of the People."); Richard Briffault, "What About the
'Ism'?" Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1303, 1326 (1994) ("[Glrass-roots participation in local government has occurred
without the protections of federalism despite the formally subordinate status of local
governments in state-local relations."); Gerald E. Frug, The City As a Legal Concept, 93
HARv. L. REV. 1059, 1121 (1980) (arguing that decentralizing power from a
centralized state to the cities can be regarded as "a defense of freedom");Jerry Frug,
Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 271 (1993) ("[Sltates could never
engender the kind of democratic participation in public affairs that is possible on a
local basis."); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54
U. CH. L. REV. 1484, 1493-1500 (1987) (arguing that decentralized government is
better able to reflect the diversity of interests of individuals, will reduce "externalities"
in government structure, and will allow for innovation and competition in govern-
ment). For an overview of arguments for decentralization and local decisionmaking,
see generally DANIELJ. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM (1987).
"' See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 28, at 23-25 (describing the perverse
incentives of a universalistic legislative body with national taxing and spending
powers).
82 See NISKANEN, supra note 54, at 6 (noting that, in the budget context, the
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not at issue at the local level to the same degree.8" In this sense,
the case on behalf of a centralized presidency is reminiscent of the
traditional argument for synoptic over common law decisionmaking:
When issues become sufficiently interrelated, microassessment may
lose the complexity of the big picture. 4 Under the unitary view of
the presidency, the chief executive is thought to be in the best
institutional position to focus attention on complex national
concerns in the modern New Deal state. 5
acquisition of information is difficult and expensive and therefore people operate in
"rational ignorance"). These factors are considered less important, however, with
respect to traditional local functions. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463
(1991) (stating that the authority of the states to determine the qualifications of their
most important government officials "lies at the heart of representative government").
a' The standard critique of the autonomous New Deal agency captured by the iron
triangle of Washington illuminates these problems and the potential value of
presidential intervention. The theory of vertical integration assumed by the unitary
presidency approach could thus be understood under a transaction cost view of
political and economic organization. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) (discussing the transaction cost
approach to economic organization, which maintains that the institutions of
capitalism "have the main purpose and effect of economizing on transaction costs").
'" See Posner, supra note 78, at 433 (advocating the use of "top-down" reasoning,
in which existing and future judicial decisions are accepted or rejected, explained, and
analyzed within the broader context of an adopted legal theory, as opposed to
"bottom-up" legal reasoning, in which specific case law, rather than the underlying
legal theory, is used as a starting point).
' See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism Afterthe New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,
440 (1987) (arguing that the increased power of the president during the New Deal
was a result of the reformers' view that the separation of powers prevented the
government from taking action). Of course, at some point, those identified with
"conservatism" may become suspicious of strong presidents because of the
institution's ability to redistribute resources. The power of a strong political
institution can be used to improve government performance, as well as to redistribute
resources, either up or down. For a discussion of this aspect of parties, see Steven
G. Calabresi, Political Parties As Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479, 1480
(1994) (discussing the idea that "the party system might be able to overcome the
separation of powers by bringing together under informal arrangements what the
founders were at pains to divide by formal ones");Jonathan R. Macey, The Role of the
Democratic and Republican Parties As Organizers of Shadow Interest Groups, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 4, 18-27 (1990) (explaining the role of parties as that of a political brokerage
firm that both reduces the transaction costs of political organization and substitutes
for ideology in determining a politician's future responses to issues). Perhaps for this
reason, conservatives often temper their arguments for a strong president with a
recognition of the need to protect individual rights, especially economic rights. See
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7 (1962).
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C. The Problems of the Modem Presidency
If the presidency has become a more visible and formally
powerful institution in the eyes of some legal scholars, however, that
development does not appear to have generated greater respect or
support for its inhabitants. Indeed, while there may be a great deal
of debate over whether a particular president did a good job, or
whether the institution of the presidency is more effective than
Congress, the public often seems to believe that individual presi-
dents are ineffective. While this is certainly a result of presidential
mistakes and cultural changes,86 something more fundamental seems
to be going on. As a general matter, the public is consistently more
likely to favor their congressperson than the president, at least so
long as the president remains in office. Since 1965, public approval
ratings for presidents have generally declined, 7 leading to numer-
ous descriptions of the modern chief executive as a "beleaguered
president."8 8 "The decline in presidential popularity is one of the
most well-documented trends in recent American politics."8 9 In
contrast, even though we hate Congress as an institution, we tend
to like our individual representative, particularly after she has
served in the position for a number of terms. Something about the
office of the presidency delegitimates its exercise of power.
The individual statistics, which underscore these general
observations, are sobering and seem to be getting worse over time.
As one recent review of the literature concluded, "all presidents face
a decline of support, in both the first and second term, that
continues from the first year well into the third."" There are
constant reports of "failed presidencies" during this period.9
While some presidents have been able to take actions that alter this
trend, especially when they move into a campaign mode at the end
86 See WILDAVSKY, supra note 3, at 133-49 (analyzing why the Democratic Party has
lost five of the last six presidential elections and addressing negative campaigning,
media influence and bias, size of constituency and desire to split control, and
determining that a rise in egalitarianism is the root cause).
8 7 See EDWARDS, supra note 21, at 129-30 (presenting year-by-year average
presidential approval rates and suggesting that this decline can in part be traced to
the public reaction to and residual effects of the Vietnam War and Watergate).
'8 WILDAVSKY, supra note 3, at 24.
89 WATTENBERG, supra note 37, at 66.
90 PAUL BRACE & BARBARA HINCKLEY, FOLLOW THE LEADER 10 (1992); see also
EDWARDS, supra note 21, at 28-30 (noting that average presidential approval ratings
have dropped since 1965).
9' WILDAVSKY, supra note 3, at 24.
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of a term, the structural imperative for every president is noticeable.
All things being equal, the president's exercise of power and
articulation of public positions often undermine the confidence in
and the informal power of his presidency. "Active presidents are
not rewarded in the polls; popular presidents win more but generally
ask less."92 One recent example of this relationship is the ascendan-
cy of President Clinton in the polls after the Republicans won
majorities in Congress and Speaker Newt Gingrich became the focus
of political attention and activity-in effect, the informal presi-
dent.
93
Why this skepticism toward presidential performance? Why are
presidents, who presumably are the most astute and successful
politicians before they assume office, often so unsuccessful in their
position, especially as compared to the average congressperson?
Although an analysis and comparison of post- and pre-New Deal
presidents is beyond the scope of this Article, there does appear to
be something about the modern presidency that undermines its
support.
To understand the problems and tradeoffs raised by presidential
accountability, one needs to move beyond the simple observation
that a centralized and visible presidency can minimize "transaction
costs." The next four Parts of this Article discuss the several ways
in which the visibility and centralization of the presidency may
undermine the influence of the office and help explain the paradox
of the modern president's power.
II. CONFLICT MEDIATION
A. What Is Conflict Mediation?
The first way that the individuality and visibility of the president
may undermine his power is by thwarting his ability to mediate
conflicts, especially as compared to that of Congress. Put in its
simplest terms, mediating conflict means overcoming the social and
9 BRACE & HINCKLEY, supra note 90, at 81 (emphasis added).
9 3 See Richard Benedetto, Clinton Gets a Bump, Gingrich Slides in Polls, USA TODAY,
Feb. 7, 1995, at 4A (reporting that shortly after the Republican-controlled Congress
took power, President Clinton's overall job approval rating rose from 47% to 49%,
while Newt Gingrich's disapproval numbers went up 13 percentage points to 48%);
New Poll Shows Clinton More Popular, Reuters, Feb. 6, 1995 (noting that a February,
1995 poll reflected President Clinton's highest approval rating since June 11-12,
1994), available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.
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political costs of resolving redistributional and symbolic disputes,
that is, making real or symbolic tradeoffs. Such problems arise in
countless contexts, from fights among interest groups over the
distribution of government largesse to litigation over rules on
abortion counseling or funding, to symbolic disputes over incom-
mensurable values94 or relative status.9 5 As the developing litera-
ture in game theory has shown, there are no clear "pareto superior"
solutions or even clear outcomes to most decisions with distribu-
tional or symbolic effects.9 6 Thus, there is no logical "transaction
cost" method for determining how the government pie should be
" See Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy:
Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121,
2168 (1990) ("[T]o endorse one value over another in a political choice.., would be
to subordinate one group of citizens to another."); Frederick Schauer, Commensur-
ability and Its Constitutional Consequences, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 785, 790 (1994) (debating
the existence of incommensurable values); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and
Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 800 (1994) ("The claim of incommensur-
ability is that no unitary metric accounts for how we actually think and that the effort
to introduce one misdescribes experience.").
" See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE LJ. 1, 18-26 (1992)
(discussing the effects of negative relative preferences). For examples of cases that
raise such symbolic issues rather starkly, see Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
(ruling on Congress's prohibition against using federal funds for abortion counsel-
ing); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (ruling on
Pennsylvania's statutory restrictions against the use of public facilities for performing
abortions or providing reproductive counseling concerning abortion); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (ruling on Texas's prohibition against flag burning).
For a discussion of the flag burning controversy in particular, see generally Charles
Tiefer, The Flag-Burning Controversy of 1989-1990: Congress' Valid Role in Constitutional
Dialogue, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 357 (1992). For the classic discussion of status
politics, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt-1954, in THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 41, 87 (1967) ("[S]tatus
politics does more to express emotions than to formulate policies.").
' This result does not depend on imperfect information. See generally Ken
Binmore et al., The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling, 17 RANDJ. ECON.
176 (1986) (comparing two theories of bargaining and the different types of
information used in formulating such models); Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium
in a BargainingModel, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97 (1982) (discussing the effects of differing
levels of information on contractual bargaining).
Politics necessarily involves confronting such issues-that is, preferring or
seeming to prefer the interests .or goals of some groups over others in defining and
pursuing the overall public interest. Indeed, coordinating collective action can
require treating some people as means and not ends by preventing them from
second-guessing the substantive validity of governmental decisions. See FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 162-63 (1991) (explaining that rules often sacrifice
individualism to foster collective action by subordinating individual interests to the
welfare of the group); Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1197, 1214-15 (1994) (pointing out the advantage of
inherent deception in rules as a means of overcoming collective action problems).
1996] THE PARADOX OF POWER IN THE MODERN STATE 859
divided or public symbols chosen.
Unfortunately, such issues must be confronted when structuring
political institutions-even in terms of simply evaluating their
"efficiency" or "strength"-because disagreement and conflict over
distributional and symbolic issues carry serious social implications.
Because someone will always be made worse off than her ideal in
such disputes, political actors may try to withhold support or
strategically retaliate by refusing to give their assent, exercising a
veto, or defecting to another coalition.9 7 Such activities can lead,
in law and economics terms, to high "inefficiencies" or, in political
terms, to weak institutions. 98  To be effective or "powerful,"
political institutions must be able to manage such disputes effective-
ly over time." From a political perspective, a leader or institution
capable of resolving such disagreements can make political groups
better than they would have been had they been left to their own
strategic devices.
B. How Political Institutions Mediate Conflict
As a practical matter, methods for mediating conflict usually
require some sort of agreement on substantive norms, on a process
for generating norms, or on a system for avoiding choice. Because
such devices are necessarily culturally contingent, l0 0 the way in
which institutions mediate conflict varies. Political institutions and
actors can, for example, secure ex ante agreement on a process that
the public considers legitimate and that would resolve the con-
flict;1 'O they can avoid an explicit resolution by presumptively
97 See 1 BRIAN BARRY, THEORIES OFJUSTICE 32 (1989) (explaining that parties with
conflicting self-interests may threaten each other to increase their bargaining power
in nonagreement contexts).
The design of political institutions does not allow a neat separation of
"distributive" issues from other questions for purposes of resolution by some
"independent" institution. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 35-37; Cooter, supra
note 19, at 19 (comparing the Coase theorem and the Hobbes theorem in the context
of government efficiencies).
" The fact that the president has been elected by a majority of the population and
thus can claim support from "We the People" does not allow him to avoid conflict.
See infra part II.C.
100 See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 684 (1985).
1 ' See generally ALLAN LIND & THOMAS TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (arguing that people are more interested in issues of
process than issues of outcome). For empirical evidence that a sense of fairness is
crucial to parties' ability to reach agreement, see Alvin E. Roth, Toward a Focal-Point
Theory of Bargaining, in GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAINING 259,259-64 (Alvin
E. Roth ed., 1985) (detailing experiments that found that credible bargaining
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relying on the status quo;10 2 they can create "neutral" decisional
rules, such as "universalism" or "something for everyone," that
supposedly avoid moral or symbolic choice;103 or they can affirma-
tively attempt to persuade the relevant actors through leadership or
development of communal norms to change their views or "prefer-
ences."
10 4
One can identify examples of these approaches in different
structures and procedures of various federal political institutions.
For instance, in earlier periods of the House and Senate, particu-
larly on the appropriations committees, an institutionally induced
norm of cooperation was probably influential in promoting
agreement.'0 5 In these situations, repeat players in a small group
may feel social pressure to compromise. °" This approach also
positions were focal points for subsequent negotiations).
"o See Stephen Holmes, GagRules or the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY 19, 20-21 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstand eds., 1988) (summarizing
Rawls's argument and maintaining that "theorists ofjustice can achieve their principal
aim only by steering clear of irresolvable metaphysical disputes");John Rawls,Justice
As Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 251 (1985) (arguing
that the stability of the state is dependent on removing certain issues from the
political agenda).
1o1 See Pildes & Anderson, supra note 94, at 2166-75 (discussing the desirability of
democratic institutions that employ cycling and neutrality, and that avoid extreme
positions in decisionmaking).
'1 4 See JONATHAN BOSWELL, COMMUNITY AND THE ECONOMY: THE THEORY OF
PUBLIC CO-OPERATION 130 (1990) (describing the role of "para-intermediaries" who
"exercise leadership by perceiving needs and opportunities for public cooperation,
... innovating methods for achieving it, and organizing it operationally"); see also
Posner, supra note 61, at 5 (explaining the theory of group solidarity).
105 See AARON WILDAVSKY, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 95-96
(1988) (describing how the politics of the "old process" operated under consensus).
See generally RICHARD FENNO, THE POWER OF THE PURSE (1966) (describing the
internal decisionmaking of House and Senate Committees in the period between the
late 1940s and the mid-1960s).
"0 For a general review of the literature and a discussion of the ability of groups
to reach communal norms, see Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The
Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003,
1008-25 (1995) (describing why the level of cooperation is much higher than
economic theory would predict); see also WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF
POLITICAL COALITIONS 51 (1962) (explaining that individuals in small groups are less
likely to see problems as zero-sum games and are likely to value avoiding subjective
animosity from others). As Professor Robert Putnam has noted, "Success in
overcoming dilemmas of collective action and the self-defeating opportunism that
they spawn depends on the broader social context.... Voluntary cooperation is
easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock of social capital, in the
form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement." ROBERT PUTNAM,
MAKING DEMOCRACIES WORK 167 (1993); see also JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS
OF SOCIAL THEORY 300-21 (1990) (explaining that shared religious ideology
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may be reflected in doctrines developed under the National Labor
Relations Act, such as the obligation to "bargain in good faith,"'0 °
which are felt to be helpful in inducing agreement but which are
otherwise unexplainable under ordinary law and economics crite-
ria. ' Old style political parties, which were criticized for their
homogeneity and hierarchy, served a similar function by pressuring
members to come together for the "good of the group" on election
day, thereby avoiding open disputes among participants. 10 9
In today's much more fluid and open political environment,
various divisions of responsibility can promote agreement by
avoiding conflict over inconsistent world views. The most common
technique is to divide governmental decisionmaking authority, such
as when Congress allocates control to committees through "univer-
salism" or the president assigns political control of different
agencies to different constituencies. This approach parallels the
incremental or "muddling through" philosophy in budgeting and
policymaking,"0 which is thought to avoid long-term, and poten-
tially divisive, issues in favor of a focus on more narrow and
immediate concerns."1  Divisions of responsibility also help
contributes to social capital and "social-structural connections"); Posner, supra note
61, at 46 (describing how unions use compromise to increase collective wealth). This
process may also explain the ability of New Deal agencies and subunits to reach
agreements. Unfortunately, their homogeneity, which facilitated agreement between
the agency and regulated groups, was also a source of their normative illegitimacy.
'o, See National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
o See generally Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics
of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction andApplication to the Problems of Subcontracting,
Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1988) (exploring the duty to
bargain in good faith from an economic perspective).
," See Fitts, Ignorance, supra note 47, at 949 (explaining how political parties
created a greater sense of collective identity).
110 See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 16 (1971)
(explaining that to "provide a high degree of mutual security for government and
oppositions" requires wide "opportunities for oppositions to contest the conduct of
the government"); CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 335
(1965) (explaining that "appraisal of partisan mutual adjustment for purposes of
control must be carried on through fragmented, disjointed, and incremental analysis
rather than through synopsis"); see also Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice,
77 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 734, 744 (1983) (arguing that the "pluralist political process
leads to unstable political choice, and that such instability of choice in fact fosters the
stability of pluralist political systems"); Posner, supra note 78, at 446 (describing the
step-by-step approach to constitutional theory); Sunstein, supra note 78, at 759
(analyzing legal outcomes by working from analogies and low-level principles rather
than from large theoretical principles). In effect, incrementalism uses the status quo
as a normatively acceptable default rule.
.. The need to avoid distributional conflict has been offered as one justification
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explain Establishment Clause prohibitions against government
involvement in certain religious issues, which would trigger socially
divisive conflict in a religiously divided society.1 ' As Professor
Steven Holmes has observed, "Democracy becomes possible.., only
when certain emotionally charged solidarities and commitments are
displaced from the political realm.""'3
A final way that modern political institutions can mediate
conflict is by committing ex ante to a "neutral process or institu-
tion," such as the deficit restrictions adopted in the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act,"4 the powers of standing committees in the
House of Representatives," 5 and the recommendations of the
Commission on Base Realignment and Closure." 6 All of these
structures serve to create a type of real world veil of ignorance,
which can facilitate agreement."7 When participants establish and
assent to each of these procedures, they remain unaware of what or
how many specific conflicts will be resolved."' This analysis is
for a common law property rights system. See Richard A. Epstein, Possession As the
Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1237 (1979); see also Alexander & Sherwin, supra
note 96, at 1206, 1218-19 (arguing that utilitarian governments have an incentive to
convince their citizens that property rights are based in natural law even if they were
only accepted for utilitarian reasons because the natural rights pretext would prevent
citizens from making personal evaluations of the utility of property rights); cf. Russell
Hardin, Magic on the Frontier: The Norm of Efficiency, 144 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming
May 1996) (describing a similar argument by Hobbes that favors the status quo in the
selection of a form of government).
.. For the classic exposition, see Paul A. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969) ("While political debate and division is normally
a wholesome process for reaching viable accommodations, political division on
religious lines is one of the principal evils that the first amendment sought to
forestall.").
"1 STEVEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT 207 (1995); see also GUIDO
CALABRESI & PHILLIP BOBBiT, TRAGIc CHOICES 38 (1978) (outlining the problems
involved in integrating values into political decisions); RIKER, supra note 106, at 174-
75 (explaining that political instability may be moderated by "an internalized
morality" or the "structure of the system").
114 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
177, 99 Stat. 1037 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 31 & 42 U.S.C.).
11 See Fitts, Ignorance, supra note 47, at 972 (arguing that precommitment to
committee structure in Congress may help diffuse conflict).
116 See supra note 26.
117 Compare JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 135-42 (1971) (explaining a
fundamental condition of his theory that hypothetical social contractors be unaware
of information about themselves when deciding upon those principles that are to
govern social institutions) with Fitts, Ignorance, supra note 47, at 922 (suggesting that
less information makes political agreements easier to reach because actors with less
information may avoid politically controversial issues).
118 See Fitts, Ignorance, supra note 47, at 966 (noting that a "veil of ignorance...
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similar to traditional defenses of process-based theories of judicial
review and of pluralism in general, which view current government.
political structures as legitimate because of the inability of political
participants to predict how they will resolve a particular political dis-
pute." 9 Recent game theory analyses have lent some further
support to this observation: Less clarity of results among partici-
pants can decrease strategic behavior because actors are less likely
to take action based on the distributive effects of decisions.
20
Indeed, according to empirical studies conducted by social psycholo-
gists, the public accepts adverse outcomes more willingly if there is
an ex ante perception of a "fair process."1
21
Under this analysis, the decentralized and multimember
structure of Congress can be-ironically-an advantage, at least where
political divisions become serious and conflict mediation becomes
important. On a strategic level, members of Congress can always
claim to be working for their constituents and their constituents
alone. If they cannot satisfy all of their constituents' wishes, they
can blame the institution's neutral processes, such as the rules
committee and voting rules, which were put in place before any
around the consequences of social policy for individual groups' interests... may help
promote a rational dialogue and forge a political consensus").1 9 SeeJOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW
181 (1980) (explaining thatjudicial review should only address "questions of participa-
tion" and not the "substantive merits of the political choice under attack"); Michael
J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 830
(1991) (arguing that "political process theory is the only promising constitutional
theory on the table"). But see Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980) (criticizing the process-
perfecting theory ofjudicial review as "radically indeterminate and fundamentally
incomplete"). For the classic articulation of the pluralist view, see DAVID B. TRUMAN,
THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 501-35
(1951) (discussing the structure and operation of interest groups and concluding that
the "total pattern of government over a period of time thus presents a protean
complex of crisscrossing relationships that change in strength and direction with
alterations in the power and standing of interests").
110 Because a common source of strategic behavior is assymetric information,
eliminating the assymetry through mutual ignorance eliminates this cause of the
strategic behavior. See, e.g., Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, Efficient
Mechanismsfor Bilateral Trading, 29J. ECON. THEORY 265, 265 (1983) (discussing the
consequences of assymetric information).
121 See LIND & TYLER, supra note 101, at 172 (offering one author's general set of
criteria of procedural fairness in political settings); see also Albert P. Weale, Representa-
tion, Individualism, and Collectivism, 91 ETHICS 457, 463 (1981) (emphasizing the
"importance to a group of having some of its members visibly present on major
decision-making bodies" to reconcile members "to the inevitable disappointments of
policymaking").
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specific controversy arrived. Thus, the collective action problem
becomes a mediation advantage because the institution, not the
individual politician, is held responsible for the lack of institutional
mediation.1 22 The complexity and size of Congress also allow the
leadership to exercise agenda control, thereby permitting the
institution to avoid reaching definitive decisions in difficult cases or
to resolve divisive issues at an optimal moment.123 At the same
time, when it does "decide" an issue, Congress can speak in
complex legislation with different voices, taking inconsistent
positions and thereby avoiding some conflict. Thus, in legitimating
negative or controversial outcomes, members of Congress can rely
on their precommitment to certain institutional rules and proce-
dures and the ambiguity of collective action. In this sense, the
frequent criticism of Congress that it is inefficient and universalistic
can have a silver lining-its decentralization can avoid open divisions
and conflict. One well-documented result is the high incumbency
rate in Congress-members can blame the institution for collective
failure, avoid taking stands on controversial issues that may divide
their constituency, and take credit for more narrow legislative
action. 124
C. Why the Structure of the Modem Presidency
Can Undermine Conflict Mediation
The theory of the modern presidency stands in stark contrast to
this analysis. As noted above, one of the supposed strengths of the
modern president is his ability to place himself at the focal point of
government and to be the central mediator of more and more
interests. This can be an important advantage in communicating
with the public, facilitating cooperative solutions, and, in certain
cases, exercising agenda control. The centrality of a unitary
president is also thought to serve as a moderating influence, as the
president is forced to forge a majority coalition among divergent
' See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
12 For a discussion on the value of agenda control, see DENNIS C. MUELLER,
PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 87-94 (rev. ed. 1989); see also HOLMES, supra note 113, at 204
("Legislatures are enjoined from officially discussing questions which, if placed under
the control of electoral majorities, would (it is thought) induce government paralysis,
squander everyone's time, or exacerbate factual animosities.").
1
24 
See MORRIS P. FIORiNA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISH-
MENT 48-49 (2d ed. 1989) (arguing that the "incumbency effect" is a result of
Congress members rationally devoting more resources to constituency service instead
of policymaking).
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groups.'25 These advantages can be an important source of power.
But as the president becomes increasingly able to perform these
functions, that is, as he becomes more modern, unitary, and
formally and informally powerful, he can become less able, as a
structural matter, to perform many of the mediation and agenda
control functions described above. The reasons for this develop-
ment are related to his visibility and singularity, which can under-
mine the president's ability to avoid issues, control the agenda, and
mediate conflict. Unitary, visible presidents have greater difficulty
claiming that it is the "administration" or some neutral pre-
commitment process of decisionmaking that led the executive
branch to a particular position.'26 Under the theory of the unitary
presidency, he alone must bear responsibility. For the same reason,
the president may be less able to take inconsistent or vague
positions on different issues or to refuse to take positions on the
ground that inconsistencies should be left to stand.2 7
While the president's singularity may give him the formal ability
to exercise agenda control, which public choice scholars see as an
advantage of presidential power, his visibility and the influence of
the media may also make it more difficult for him to exercise it.
When public scrutiny is brought to bear on the White House,
surrounding such issues as gays in the military or affirmative action,
the president must often take a position and act. 28  This can
deprive him of the ability to choose when or whether to address
issues. Finally, the unitary president may be less able to rely on
preexisting congressional or agency processes to resolve disputes.
At least in theory, true unitariness means that he has the authority
to reverse the decisions or non-decisions of others-the buck stops
125 See Calabresi, supra note 31, at 98 ("The advantage of presidential government
... comes from the likelihood that the President will turn into the spokesperson of
a centrist majority coalition ....").
126 Cf. RICHARDJ. ELLIS, PRESIDENTIAL LIGHTNING RODS: THE POLITICS OF BLAME
AVOIDANCE 1-14 (1994) (illustrating through historical case studies how presidents
attempt to avoid accountability by shifting blame onto their advisers).
"2 See Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an
Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 273, 302 (1993) (noting how an
inconsistent position taken by President Bush with respect to the FCC's affirmative
action policy led to a weakening of presidential control over the agency). For an
analysis of Devins's approach, see Michael Fitts, Ways to Think About the Unitary
Executive: A Comment on Approaches to Government Structure, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 323,
332-35 (1993).
1
28 See FRED I. GREENSTEIN ET AL., EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN PRESIDENCY at iii
(1977) (arguing that "[p]residents have had to be leaders whether they chose to be or
not").
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with the president. 129  In this environment, "no politician can
endure opposition from a wide range of opponents in numerous
contests without alienating a significant proportion of voters."
30
Two types of tactics illustrate this phenomenon. First, presi-
dents in recent years have often sought to deemphasize-at least
politically-their unitariness by allocating responsibility for different
agencies to different political constituencies. President Clinton, for
example, reportedly "gave" the Department ofJustice to the liberal
wing of the Democratic party and the Department of the Treasury
and the OMB to the conservatives."' Presidents Bush and Reagan
tried a similar technique of giving control over different agencies to
different political constituencies.
132
Second, by invoking vague abstract principles or "talking out of
both sides of their mouth," presidents have attempted to create the
division within their person. Eisenhower is widely reported to be
the best exemplar of this "bumbling" technique. 3 3  Reagan's
widely publicized verbal "incoherence" and detachment from
government affairs probably served a similar function.'
3 4
Unfortunately, the visibility and singularity of the modern
presidency can undermine both informal techniques. To the extent
that the modern president is subject to heightened visibility about
what he says and does and is led to make increasingly specific
statements about who should win and who should lose on an issue,
his ability to mediate conflict and control the agenda can be
undermined. The modern president is supposed to have a position
'2 See discussion supra part I.B (discussing the theory of the unitary presidency);
see also Michael Nelson, Why Americans Hate Politics and Politicians 28 POL. SCI. & POL.
72, 74 (1995) (describing the need of politicians and government officials to blame
each other in the current political environment).
150 WATTENBERG, supra note 37, at 160.
's' See Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton Cabinet Choices Put Him at Center, Balancing
Competing Factions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1992, at 22 (observing that, in constructing
his cabinet, Clinton "included representatives of many views rather than choosing
between rival schools of thought within the Democratic Party").
1.2 See id. (reporting that "Ronald Reagan delegated large areas of responsibility
to others, and often let rival factions fight it out"); see also Fitts, supra note 127, at 333
(discussing how Presidents Nixon, Bush, and Clinton appointed officials with
conflicting views to different government positions in order to avoid conflict).133 
See FRED I. GREENSTEIN, THE HIDDEN-HAND PRESIDENCY: EISENHOWER AS
LEADER 66-72 (1982) (criticizing the perception that Eisenhower was more of a
"bumbler" than a leader and discussing Eisenhower's effective use of ambiguous
statements in press conferences).
134 See BoB SCHIEFFER & GARY P. GATES, THE ACTING PRESIDENT 192-96 (1989)
(discussing how Reagan avoided political decisions within his administration by
remaining "hands-off").
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on such matters as affirmative action, the war in Bosnia, the
baseball strike, and the newest EPA regulations-the list is infinite.
Perhaps in response to these pressures, each modern president has
made more speeches and taken more positions than his predeces-
sors, with Bill Clinton giving three times as many speeches as
Reagan during the same period." 5 In such circumstances, the
president is far less able to exercise agenda control, refuse to take
symbolic stands, or take inconsistent positions. The well-docu-
mented tendency of the press to emphasize the strategic implica-
tions of politics exacerbates this process by turning issues into zero-
sum games. 1 6  Thus, in contrast to Congress, the modern
president's attempt to avoid or mediate issues can often undermine
him personally and politically.
This tension may explain in part why pollsters who review the
modern presidents have found that, even though they are more
active, "the more positions a president takes-the lower [his public]
approval ratings will be."' It also may reveal why the recent
ascendancy and visibility of Newt Gingrich led to an increase in
President Clinton's approval ratings: he was no longer the focus of
attention as the "president." While proponents of a rule of law
might see the president's visibility as a normative advantage, 3 '
and law and economics scholars might view it as a source of
information and lower "monitoring costs," it is a disadvantage with
respect to his ability to avoid issues or achieve agreement on
distributive issues or value judgments-that is, his ability to mediate
' See Carol Gelderman, All the Presidents' Words, WILSON Q., Spring 1995, at 68,
70; see also id, at 79 ("Clinton makes matters worse by trying to get back on track with
speeches that play to public opinion, creating new disconnects between past
proclamations and present ones.").
136 See KATHLEEN H.JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS 191 (1992) (describing the press's
tendency during campaigns to emphasize "the strategy, game plan, and horse race of
campaigns" rather than policy discussions); THOMAS E. PATTERSON, OUT OF ORDER
129 (1993) (describing the "tendency of reporters" to focus on "strategy and
personality").
137 BRACE & HINCKLEY, supra note 90, at 81. Thus, when presidents take positions,
they lower their public approval. "Active position taking on votes in Congress and
domestic travel ... hurt public support." Id. at 174.
"' See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1548
(1988) (naming the commitment to detached deliberation as a source of the
contemporary appeal of republican thought). See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
SOCIALJUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980) (arguing for the ideal of dialogue under
a framework of neutral and consistent principles); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE (1985); JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM
212 (1993) (arguing for an ideal of "public reason" as the principle for public debate).
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conflict.
Paradoxically, to the extent the modern unitary president is
perceived as more powerful-that is, that he can use his position to
effect greater change-the problem would be exacerbated. s9  The
reason is that the public would assume that a unitary president who
enjoys broad formal and informal authority could achieve greater
change through presidential intervention.1 4 The fact that the
views and positions of a unitary presidency must be captured in the
values of a single individual, rather than in a varied institution such
as Congress, could complicate this problem, even though it is
supposed to be a moderating advantage for him.' Thus, although
a modern president may have diminished ability to mediate conflict
due to his unitariness, he may be increasingly faced by a public that
may perceive greater risk in his participation in government
decisions. Presidential activities in the modern era may simply
require more decisions to be mediated."4
D. Ideological or Nonstructural Methods of
Presidential Conflict Mediation
Of course, a modern president has resources for confronting
these problems. His ability to appear nonpartisan and invoke
national symbols is a traditional source of strength. In the past, for
1s9 Law and economics scholars would refer to the president's ability to generate
public benefits as a surplus. See Cooter, supra note 19, at 17 (describing "surplus" as
the benefits obtained through bargaining and cooperation).
140 If all distributional issues are up for grabs, this may explain why some
conservatives are concerned about a strong president. See Calabresi, supra note 85,
at 1507-08 (noting the conflicting distributional goals of the president and other
branches such as Congress).
1" See Calabresi, supra note 31, at 41 (discussing Alexander Hamilton's view that
a unitary president, while increasing "energy" in government, also promotes
accountability by placing responsibility for wrong-doing in a single actor). This
problem illustrates one of the advantages of a traditional political party. Because a
strong party is not controlled by or identified with one person, it is thought to
tolerate more difference of opinion within the tent. Similarly, this analysis suggests
that officials at lower levels of government may have less of a problem. In general,
mayors and governors have less visibility. In addition, other institutions, such as the
federal government, are often viewed as more responsible for outcomes.
142 In this sense, legislative bodies have the paradoxical advantage of being subject
either to cycling majority rule or universalism. This produces, in technical terms, less
distributional variance or risk. See Miller, supra note 110, at 738-39 (discussing the
consequences of "cyclical majorities"); see alsoJames Q. Wilson, The Newer Deal, NEW
REPUBLIC, July 2, 1990, at 32, 37 ("[T]here has been a transformation of public
expectations about the scope of federal action, one that has put virtually everything
on the public agenda and left nothing off.").
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example, the Cold War against communism may have strengthened
presidential authority by presenting the nation with a less divisive
issue to which the president could respond with a single unified
national standard, and for which central control, as outlined above,
would have been important. Indeed, this effect led President
Clinton to remark that he envied President Kennedy for "having an
enemy."
143
A more important institutional source of presidential power in
this regard, though, has probably been the president's ability to
claim democratic legitimacy, as suggested by the theory of the
unitary presidency outlined above. 144  To justify decisions and
secure agreements, presidents have, in the past, stressed the
importance of abstract party loyalty, the institutional integrity of the
president as the only national democratic representative of all "the
People," and the democratic pedigree of the president's position,
supposedly vindicated by "the People" in the last presidential
election.
1 45
Yet, the ability of the president to justify actions through
claims of "democratic legitimacy" has diminished in many ways.
While the president could rely in the past on his popular election
to legitimate his current position, today, public opinion polls
and instant communication can bolster virtually any opposing
political leader who claims popular support on a particular
issue.1 4' A president Clinton who is elected on a pledge to
Ws Richard Reeves, Why Clinton Wishes He WereJFK, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 27,
1995, at 16. The threat of communism was a presidential foreign policy issue that
required comparatively less dispute resolution. See BRACE & HINCKLEY, supra note
90, at 45 (describing the usefulness of foreign crises to presidential popularity).
Foreign policy today does not offer such a dispute-free unifying symbol. See Alison
Mitchell, Campaign Trail or Garden Path?, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at E5 ("The end
of the Cold War diminished the public's sense that the President is the man with his
finger on the button, the nation's bulwark against a superpower confrontation.").
144 See supra part I.B.
145 These symbols are especially valuable during periods of strong party politics
and during elections, when unifying symbols tend to be most salient and the public's
position on issues tends to be more deliberate and consistent. See Fitts, Ignorance,
supra note 47, at 943-44 (explaining that political parties "can serve as a structure that
frames issues and programs in clear and simple terms for the whole public" and
"promote public understanding of political events").
Symbols of authority allow the president, in effect, either to "persuade" the
opposition to change positions or to overcome opposition through his publicly
perceived strength and legitimacy. When these symbols are used effectively by the
president, his party is more likely to control all parts of government, thus reducing
the need for conflict mediation.
146 See Celderman, supra note 135, at 79 ("In an age vastly more complicated than
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reform health care, for example, must confront polling data that
shows his plan does not enjoy popular support. At the same time,
the narrowness of many of the issues faced by a modern unitary
president and the decline of party identification more generally
reduce the president's ability to rely on a past broad electoral
mandate to legitimate particular decisions. 4 7 Modern leaders do
not run on the basis of a clear platform. In this environment, the
president's ability to lay claim to the democratic or party mantle has
declined; he must often piece together a divergent coalition,
bargaining, like other politicians, with individual political actors and
groups who hold positions of influence in our divided government.
This process of keeping members of a coalition together and
prioritizing issues depends much more on conflict mediation skills
than the traditional reliance upon party loyalty and claims of
democratic legitimacy.
In light of this shift, what should a unitary president do to
maximize his influence? Under this analysis, his position demands
a subtle balancing of roles. As the sweep of history has shown, the
institutional power of the president is derived in part from his
ability to rise above existing incremental relations and plot a new
course for the country-that is, to solve the collective action
problem of systematic change, whatever the direction. 4  As
FDR's, it may be that no person can serve as the national voice."); see also Giovanni
Sartori, Video-Power, 24 GOV'T & OPPosrrION 39, 41-43 (1989) (discussing the
paradoxical decentralizing effect of the media, which creates increased "localism").
147 See BRACE & HINCKLEY, supra note 90, at 164 ("Although the polls have not
supplanted elections as the democratic base for a president's actions in office, at
times they can supersede them. They withdraw support from winners of landslide
elections .... ."). For a discussion of the decline of parties and of realignments, see
ALDRICH, supra note 25, at 277-96 (summarizing the historical patterns of the decline
of party relevance and the regular periods of realignment); Everett C. Ladd, Like
Waiting for Godot: The Usefulness of "Realignment" for Understanding Change in
Contemporary American Politics, in THE END OF REALIGNMENT?: INTERPRETING
AMERICAN ELECTORAL ERAS 24, 29 (Byron E. Shafter ed., 1991) (arguing that
realignment "was always too confining a vision, and it was always guilty of over-
generalizing from a unique historical circumstance"). For a discussion of the
increasing polarization of issues within the electorate, see ROBERT SCHMUHL,
DEMANDING DEMOCRACY 131-37 (1994) (discussing the political effects of this
country's increasing ethnic diversity combined with the loss of power of the
traditionally cohesive force of political parties and the growth and diversification of
the media).
148 See SKOWRONEK, supra note 33, at 17-19 (describing the differences between
presidential power and presidential authority). For discussions of the relative
advantages of synoptic and incremental change, see JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE
NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA 35-39 (1984).
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Robert Inman and I have argued,1 49 and as the literature describ-
ing a strong presidency suggests,150 when confronted with the
collective action problems of congressional and public action, the
president's clarity of position and toughness in the face of adversity
may be a precondition for effective leadership. The story of a
president engaged in successful high visibility and high stakes
politics has marked our vision of presidential leadership over the
years. 151
Unfortunately, there is another side to the story, which emerges
when the president is unsuccessful, or not involved, in such high
stakes politics. As this Part indicates, the president's role as a
visible focal point-so dependent on his singularity and clarity-can
also create a conflict that, once unleashed, hinders the modern
president's ability to mediate effectively as a single individual.' 52
In areas such as social security or health care reform, the president
may be poorly positioned to resolve conflict or to take the political
heat if he does not. To paraphrase the language of law and
economics, his virtue (in minimizing transaction costs) can be his
vice (in mediating conflict over the public benefits or "surplus"
produced by minimization).
5 3
'
49 See Fitts & Inman, supra note 8, at 1771-73 (describing how the president can
bring about significant fiscal reform by moving Congress to a new Nash equilibrium,
but only if he is very clear as to his position and remains resolute).
5" See Miller, supra note 8, at 314 (arguing that presidential influence in Congress
is dependent upon mustering public support and stating that "[t]he president's most
powerful weapon, then, is a public aroused on a specific issue"); Moe, supra note 18,
at 365 (arguing that, to be strong, a president must "show the way by charting new
paths for American society-even when these paths happen to be unpopular at the
time" and that "[s]trong leaders have the capacity for rising above politics when
necessary, for pursuing their own vision in the face of political odds").
'5' See SKOWRONEK, supra note 33, at 344-45 (describing President Johnson's
continued support of the Vietnam War to enhance the legitimacy of his other
commitments, including, specifically, the Civil Rights Act and Medicare).
'52 Clarity is a critical component of the president's ability to gain power through
the media and overcome a decentralized Congress. See Fitts & Inman, supra note 8,
at 1771-72 (showing how the president's clear commitment to one position can force
Congress to make the most efficient policy choice). At the same time, the president's
assertion of power may trigger value and distributional conflict, which he may be
poorly positioned to resolve.
153 To be successful as a unitary leader, therefore, the president must establish
institutional mechanisms appropriate to each context. See infra Conclusion.
One final point: This problem is perhaps related to, but is ultimately quite
different from, the claim that public choice theory ignores questions of social justice
and the shaping of preferences. According to the latter claim, government should
promote "good" normative goals, that is, shape citizen preferences toward attractive
ends. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L.
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III. INDIVIDUAL MORAL ASSESSMENTS
A second and related way in which the visibility and cen-
tralization of the presidency may undermine and frustrate the
exercise of presidential power is by leading the public to eval-
uate the president according to a standard of moral assessment
appropriate for individuals, rather than for institutions. A
great deal has been written over the years about the significance
of presidential "style." Usually, the endless proliferation of
relevant variables in this literature limits the generalizability of the
analyses. Every individual president has a unique style that can
explain-although only in hindsight-his success or failure. My
argument, however, is more generic: The presidential personality,
whatever the style, can undermine the institution. In this sense, the
presidential personality may produce a less valuable political "brand
name."
At first, this claim might seem unusual; as noted above in the
description of the modern president, the public personality of
politicians is usually perceived as a political advantage. Politicians
routinely attempt to create public personae as warm, caring, and
principled individuals who will do all they can to help their
constituents. This image creation is one of the benefits of constitu-
ency servicing, public posturing, and the family stories that are so
frequently planted in the press. To the extent that a politician
simply presents herself as a "good and responsive person," her
personality is usually thought to be a win-win issue, especially as
compared to her actual positions on more divisive programmatic
issues.' For members of Congress, personal connections may
also complement quite well their roles as advocates for specialized
constituencies in their districts.' 55
REV. 1129, 1172 (1986) (suggesting that legislatures and courts should promote
welfare and autonomy, even if doing so requires the alteration of public preferences).
My point is related but different: public choice theory may fail to incorporate the
social costs of dispute resolution, which can have quite serious efficiency conse-
quences.
"5 See, e.g., BRUCE CAIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL VOTE 38-40 (1987) (analyzing the
keys to running a successful campaign and observing that constituency service is
extremely important); FIORINA, supra note 124, at 42 (arguing that politicians avoid
programmatic activities because they are "inherently controversial").
155 Many commentators believe that constituency service is an important reason
for political success. See, e.g., CAIN ET AL., supra note 154, at 97 (noting that "voters
have high constituency service expectations, and congressmen work hard to meet
those expectations"); FIORINA, supra note 124, at 99 (finding that "constituency service
grew in electoral importance between the 1950s and 1970s").
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For the president, however, this type of familiarity can create
two problems. First, part of the power of the presidency is its
mystique and its ability to project general abstract symbols. The fact
that "it is not just an office of incredible power but a breeding
ground of indestructible myth" strengthens the president's author-
ity."' We seem "to look to presidents for symbolic identifica-
tion."157 To tap into this resource, presidents have relied on the
"royalty" of their position to garner broad support.'58 Yet a highly
visible personal presidency is less able to invoke the grandeur of the
office. Who is awed by the sight of a president jogging in running
shorts or commenting on each public issue? 59 "Just as putting
too much money in circulation causes inflation and diminishes the
value of a currency, too much presidential talk cheapens the value
of presidential rhetoric."
16 0
Second, the focus on individual presidents and their personali-
ties can create greater tension with the president's pursuit of
normal political activities. More than individual members of
Congress, the unitary president is necessarily in a position to
balance personally the interests of groups within his constituency as
well as to change his individual position publicly over time,
especially as he moves from the primaries, to the general election,
to the presidency, and to the advancement of legislation through
Congress. In order to be an effective leader, a president must, in
other words, be less than candid to different constituencies and
appear confident about positions that are subject to doubt or
change. But balancing interests and changing positions in different
institutional contexts can be in tension with his persona as a caring
' ROssrrER, supra note 33, at 81; see also Mitchell, supra note 143, at 5 ("[P]eople
now and always have wanted their President to be something bigger than life."
(quoting Stephen Hess, Brookings Institution)).
157 WILDAVSKY, supra note 3, at 140.
15" For a description of how one modern president attempted to shape his image,
see MICHAEL K. DEAVER & MICKEY HERSKOWrIZ, BEHIND THE SCENES 175-76 (1987),
which recounts President Reagan's use of the power and imagery of the presidency
to muster popular support.
"' See Todd S. Purdum, Underwear and All: Dignifying the President, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 1995, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3 ("'Going on MTV, [Clinton] may pick up 5
per cent of the vote, but going on MTV and talking about [his] underwear, [he] may
lose 12 per cent of the respect.'" (quoting Stephen Hess, Brookings Institute)). By
way of comparison, Franklin Roosevelt was rarely photographed in his wheelchair.
See Frank Van Riper, Political Photo Ops, WASH. POST, July 21, 1995, at N37
("Roosevelt,... by unspoken agreement, was rarely photographed in his wheelchair
or in any way that would call attention to his paralysis.").
"6 Gelderman, supra note 135, at 79.
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and principled individual. As discussed in Part II, institutions are
expected to mediate and evolve in this manner; individual politi-
cians who are supposed to have strong moral convictions may not
be offered that luxury.
The modern personal presidency thus can be caught between
the different normative standards frequently applied to individual
and familial relationships, on the one hand, and political institu-
tions, on the other. Commentators have pointed out this distinction
in moral approaches in other contexts as well.' While we apply
the personal standard to our friends, family, and extended family,
whom we expect to be trustworthy, truthful, and caring, the
president must often act impersonally toward individuals and the
public. This detachment is often needed for public institutions and
officials to balance competing interests and overcome the collective
action problems that permeate government. 162  As a result, a
single and visible president must act not only with impunity toward
many individual constituents, but also strategically in order to
balance their competing interests.
What are some illustrations of this tension? On the one hand,
the qualities that allow a politician to exercise power effectively in
the political game have conflicted with the attitudes and normative
values that will satisfy private normative standards. Reagan, for
example, was constantly asked to reconcile his public concern for
family values with his lack of concern for his own family.'
63
Similarly, Clinton has been forced to reconcile his support for
women's rights with his marital infidelity.164 Carter may have had
the opposite problem: a model personal life, but a seeming inability
to engage in instrumental political behavior.
161 See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, Ruthlessness in Public Life, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 75,
75-90 (1979) (discussing the continuities and discontinuities between public and
private morality); Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 96, at 1214 (noting that "a
requirement of perfect candor conflicts with common moral institutions").
162 See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 96, at 162-66 (noting that agents who participate
in cooperative enterprises must be willing to allocate power away from themselves
and to the collective good); Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 96, at 1197, 1214-15
(arguing that various forms of beneficial deception are created by rule givers in order
to overcome prisoner's dilemmas).
16 SeeJudy Mann, When It Comes to Living Out Family Values, WASH. POST, July 27,
1988, at B3 (describing the "hypocrisy" of the "pro-family [Reagan] administration"
as "breathtaking," with the "First Couple" "barely talk[ing] with their children").
"6 See, e.g., Michael Barone, Paying a Price for His Shortcomings, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., May 23, 1994, at 38 ("Clinton is paying a clear and measurable price for
voters' concerns about his character.").
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On the other hand, and more importantly, this tension can
subject a president's public political behavior to private standards
of morality. Clinton and Bush, for example, found that their
attempts to mediate conflict on taxes and health care through
evolving but inconsistent statements were not considered acceptable
instrumental political methods, but rather a sign of a lack of
character and moral conviction. Making "speeches that play to
public opinion" tends to "creat[e] new discon[tinuities] between past
proclamations and present ones,"165 even though politicians may
simply be attempting to keep up with evolving political forces. Good
individuals with strong moral values are not supposed to change
positions in light of changing political coalitions, although political
institutions and parties can and should do so.1 6 Caught in this
predicament, politicians easily fall subject to characterizations such
as "tricky Dick" (in the case of Nixon), "slick Willy" (in the case of
Clinton), or someone who "r[uns] under so many identities it [is]
hard to keep track of who he [is] from day to day" (in the case of
Bush).6 7 The problem is especially difficult because, as studies on
leadership have found, "[t]he ultimate impact of [a] leader [often]
depends most significantly on the particular story that he or she...
embodies."16 The personal story of a modern president attempting
to respond to changing political forces can be in tension with that
role. 1
6 9
16 Gelderman, supra note 135, at 79.
16 In the past, waffling on the issues took place largely among elites and in
private. Today it occurs in public view.
167 SKOWRONEK, supra note 33, at 441 (quoting Russell Baker, The '92 Follies: A
Show with Legs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 1, 58); see also Ross K.
Baker, Let Pos Change Views, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 24, 1995, at A23 ("We have a very
bad habit in this country of punishing those in public life who show themselves
willing to change."); Robert Schmuhl, Clinton: Consistently Inconsistent, PHILA.
INQUIRERJan. 26, 1995, at A13 (criticizing the inconsistencies in Clinton's State of
the Union speech). Foreign systems that have offices such as king or prime minister
may avoid some of these difficulties because they deflect separate individualized
scrutiny away from any single leader and onto the party more generally.
168 GARDNER, supra note 44, at 14 (emphasis added).
169 This raises a paradox: The singularity of the presidency, which supposedly
facilitates direction of the New Deal state, may be subject to an old style standard of
personal evaluation akin to the common law. Yet the New Deal supposedly replaced
the common law brand of regulation. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein,
Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1195, 1232-39 (1982) (arguing
that administrative agencies were created in part to correct the shortcomings of the
common law system, which was ill-equipped to adapt to industrial conditions).
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IV. FINDINGS OF ERRORS IN JUDGMENT
A third consequence of the increased visibility and centralization
of the presidency may be a corresponding increase in the percep-
tion of presidential error and incompetence, which can undermine
the legitimacy and power of the person who inhabits the office.
This perception may flow, I suggest, from the increasing number
and complexity of the decisions for which a unitary president is
necessarily held accountable, and on account of which there will
necessarily be more "errors" committed. How will the public
respond to this situation? As discussed below, these decisions not
only resemble the types of actions that have led the torts system to
find an inordinate amount of "negligence" in comparable circum-
stances, but they also provide an illuminating insight into the
problem.
A. Causal Responsibility in Torts
Put simply, one of the primary effects of centralizing influence
in a single individual, both formally and informally, is that the
president and the president's immediate staff become explicitly
responsible for more and more of the complicated decisions and
non-decisions of government. According to traditional "transaction
cost analysis," this internalization of responsibility at the top is the
supposed advantage of a unitary president. Yet the president's
oversight of complex liability under a theory of respondeat superior
makes the president politically liable for a wide variety of different
decisions for which he clearly has little or no information and for
which he cannot rationally even attempt to gather information.
With a truly unitary presidency, it is literally impossible to perceive
the interconnections between issues or to anticipate the future
significance of the president's or a subordinate's actions for which
the president will implicitly bear responsibility.
The most comparable circumstance in torts occurs when we
attempt to evaluate the "inattention" of tortfeasors, such as when an
actor must undertake repeated precautions in a complex environ-
ment, a common problem in today's technologically complex world.
The classic example is a driver's inadvertent failure to watch the
road at all times."' 0 In this situation, as the torts treatment has
170 In the political sphere, this case corresponds to officials who operate in
complex regulatory environments and face unavoidable stochastic error.
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shown, courts face a serious factual difficulty in determining the
actor's responsibility for error. If a pure negligence standard is
applied, the defendant needs to show that she exercised a policy of
due diligence over the long run and that, in the particular case, she
simply did not pay attention. In other words, she needs to prove
that she adopted the appropriate overall standard of care and that
the injury is an unavoidable stochastic event. Unfortunately, if this
standard applied, as Professor Mark Grady has pointed out, the
issue turns entirely on two highly uncertain, if not impossible,
factual determinations: whether a duly diligent defendant might
nevertheless make such an error because of the extra costs of paying
attention and whether the defendant in fact followed that level of
care. 
171
Because of the impossibility of gathering and assimilating
information about the overall level of attention, courts and juries
have not attempted to determine whether the defendant exercised
an appropriate level of care. According to Grady, in such situations
courts and juries "count [such results] as negligence," in effect
applying a strict liability standard.1 72  They presume that the
defendant erred. As a result, Grady observes, "there will be more
negligence [found] in places where the rate of compliance is
greatest."173  Grady not only discovered this pocket of strict
liability within our general torts system, but also suggested why we
ignored it previously. When faced with such high information
demands, we apply a standard of strict liability, which economists
argue is informationally rational.'7 4
17 See Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L. REv.
887,894-912 (1994) [hereinafter Grady, Reslpsa] (discussing compliance error, which
is the inadvertent departure from a required standard of care in relation to traditional
negligence analysis); Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable
Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 293, 321-22
(1988) (discussing the stochastic element of precaution in relation to compliance
costs).
172 Grady, Res Ipsa, supra note 171, at 907. Unlike a durable precaution, which a
court is capable of directly observing, it is impossible to examine directly the overall
level of attention a defendant actually exercised when only a momentary inattention
resulted in an accident. Ordinarily, one can inspect directly the mechanisms that
have been adopted to avoid accidents, such as air bags, and weigh their costs in
comparison to the lives potentially saved. See Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n of the United
States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 32-38 (1983) (discussing
automobile safety and legislation that mandated the installation of passive restraints
such as airbags). In the case of mental or individual systems of oversight, however,
the level of care cannot be observed directly.
173 Grady, Res Ipsa, supra note 171, at 907.
174 Indeed, Grady argues that this phenomenon explains the increases in findings
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B. Effect of This Process on Perceptions
of Presidential Error
A unitary visible president, I suggest, often finds himself in an
analogous situation to the torts defendant facing stochastic error:
he cannot possibly avoid legal or political mistake, at least asjudged
ex post. As noted above, the president is formally and informally
responsible for a broad array of decisions for which he has little
information-the list covers minor decisions involving environmental
regulations all the way to document decisions on Whitewater. At
the same time, the lack of information about these judgments often
makes it difficult for the public to determine ex post whether or not
the president was literally "negligent"-in a political sense-when he
made a particular decision that led to a mistake. To frame the issue
in torts terminology, it is difficult for the public to determine
whether the president was following "the appropriate level of care,"
and whether the failure was simply a matter of inadvertence or
reasonable time demands. The factual demands of assessing the
president's position in these cases make such evaluations extraordi-
narily difficult.' 75 Indeed, our inability to judge the balancing of
multiple policy factors has led the courts to apply the committed-to-
agency-discretion-by-law exception to analogous decisions on
resource allocation by government officials.17 6  Here, as in the
presidential context, as the number of factors to be weighed in
decisionmaking increases, the inability ex post to review the
decisionmaking increases.
This effect may be especially salient in the many factually
complex areas of criminal and ethical liability, where the line
between proper and improper behavior is inherently ambigu-
ous."" Although the examples in this context are necessarily
of tort liability associated with technological progress. See id. at 911-12. As the
complexity of our technological systems has increased, the importance of human
observation and attention, which cannot be easily monitored, has increased as well.
See id. at 946 ("The more advanced the safety technology present in the relevant
activity, the more loudly an accident speaks of negligence.").
175 One of the traditional rationales for presidential legal immunity is the court's
inability to evaluate ex post such synoptic type decisions. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731, 744-48 (1982). Because of the increased visibility of presidential activities,
the public may now be in the same situation when it evaluates individual decisions of
the president.
'
7 6 See Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. 2024, 2030-31 (1993).
177 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribey and the Inter7nediate Theoy of Politics,
32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 788 (1985) (discussing the difficulty of elucidating the
"descriptive" aspects of bribery, including the elements of the crime).
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charged politically, they are apparent on all sides. Were Carter,
Reagan, Bush, or Clinton "negligent" when they failed to take
preventive action in the various scandals that enveloped their
presidencies or in the foreign policy crises, such as Iran, Lebanon,
Iraq, and Bosnia, that occurred during their administrations?
Often, all the public really knows ex post is that a mistake was made
and that the president seems to be the most obvious person to
assume responsibility.17 ' Because the public cannot put itself in
the position of the president facing all of these different time
demands and issues, it frequently cannot say whether the mistake
was unforeseeable ex ante.'
79
C. Complicating Factors
Three other factors may complicate and exacerbate this effect.
First, the public's perception of presidential error may increase if
the president faces unique issues and a highly changing environ-
ment. To the extent that we live in a world of increased presiden-
tial responsibilities, changing conditions, and unique problems, the
number of presidential "bad outcomes" necessarily increases, at least
when viewed in hindsight, simply as a result of the better informa-
tion we invariably have. This is true even if there is no reason to
believe that actual mistakes in judgment, as viewed ex ante, have
increased or that the world has become a worse place. Needless to
say, a president who must deal with problems like Bosnia or Kuwait
proceeds upon uncharted waters, and the public may be in a poor
position to evaluate his efforts."'8
In the torts context, changes in new sectors of the economy
often lead to strict liability as a result of our inability to foresee the
nature of change., Courts make the producers of a new product
" Yet the public is unlikely to identify such mistakes as inadvertent, just as the
tort system has not been able to identify torts inadvertent errors.
"7 Even if only 10% of bad results are attributed by the public to presidential
error, the reputation of the president can be undermined. Because the president acts
alone, moreover, the issues that he faces are necessarily unique, unlike those
presented to members of Congress. There are no presidential counterparts and
therefore no common standard of care to which he can easily refer.
" Paradoxically, a president who forces synoptic change may face the greatest
amount of uncertainty under this analysis.
181 While any standard of accountability assumes an ability to predict on the basis
of past events, change makes it more difficult to predict whether in fact one can
extrapolate from past events-that is, whether one can exercise judgment. If the
world is changing over time, or even if one simply does not know whether or not the
world is changing, the value of predictive judgments, or judgments based on a high
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strictly liable because the producers are in the best position to
determine whether it is cost-justified. 8 2  As philosophers of
science have pointed out, in situations of rapid change, there may
be no rational way to judge whether or not a person has been
negligent because one never knows how the future will differ from
the past. This is one explanation for why the legal system some-
times makes those in the best position to judge mistakes and predict
the future strictly liable. Unfortunately, if the public assumes that
the president occupies this position in the political context, he may
be subject, as the instigator of broad social changes, to an analogous
overassessment of "error."
A second factor that may exacerbate this effect is the incen-
tive structure of the special counsel law. 8 3 Under the current
standard, the mere possibility of a violation of a legal norm provides
the basis for extraordinary legal and political scrutiny: a public
preliminary investigation in the Department ofJustice and later the
appointment of a special counsel."8 4 Thus, the president's proxim-
ity to a potential error with legal ramifications provides the basis
for extra investigation and scrutiny." 5 In this environment, it
number of injuries, is more limited. This explains why technological changes make
it difficult to tell whether or not someone was negligent ex ante. The problem is both
factual and philosophical: What should the standard of foreseeability be when one
does not know how the future will differ from the past? See generally NELSON
GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION AND FORECAST (Bobbs-Merrill Co., 2d ed. 1965) (1955)
(discussing how predictions are related to past experiences and possible theories of
projection); GRUE!: THE NEW RIDDLE OF INDUCTION (Douglas Stalker ed., 1994)
(compiling works that discuss theories for interpreting the future). There simply may
be no way to judge whether or not it was reasonable to take certain precautions ex
ante, although the work on bounded rationality may provide one way to understand
this problem. See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 19-23
(1983) (defining the behavioral model of bounded rationality and exploring its
consequences).
18 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962)
("The purpose of [strict] liability is to ensure that costs of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by the manufacturers ... rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves."); Escolav. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (TraynorJ., concurring) ("[Plublic policy demands
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards...
inherent in defective products .... It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate
some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.").
18S See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1988).
'- See 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1)(A) ("The Attorney General shall apply to the division
of the court for the appointment of an independent counsel if... the Attorney
General, upon completion of a preliminary investigation under this chapter,
determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is
warranted .... ").
85 The structural and competitive incentives that encourage political and media
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can be quite difficult for a president to demonstrate his compe-
tence.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, these structural incen-
tives may also intensify to the extent that a "culture of distrust"
exists in the United States-that is, a social/psychological tendency
to believe that failures are avoidable, and thus explainable, in terms
of improper behavior. Long ago, Richard Hofstadter identified a
"paranoid style" in American politics.186 In recent years, a broad
spectrum of commentators has gone on to suggest that a pervasive
cynicism exists in American society that creates a presumption that
bad events must have a malevolent or negligent cause.'8 7 Many
commentators blame the press for this development. I"8 While any
conclusions regarding the significance of a "culture of distrust" are
beyond the scope of this Article, 8 9 such skepticism, to the extent
that it exists, would undermine presidential decisions more than
organizations to expend extraordinary resources to investigate a problem, such as
executive impropriety, where there are fixed rewards for the winner, contributes to
this effect. See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
186 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, in THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 95, at 3, 3
(discussing the "heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy"
prevalent in American politics).
18 7 See EJ. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS 334 (1991) (noting that
"Americans hate politics because ... trust and commitment have eroded, and with
them the ideals of democratic citizenship"); JEFFREY C. GOLDFARB, THE CYNICAL
SOCIETY: THE CULTURE OF POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURE IN AMERICAN
LIFE 1 (1991) (stating that cynicism is the "single most pressing challenge facing
American democracy today"); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE at viii (1993)
(stating that "[o]ur public discourse has been shaped ... by the teachings, or the
popular corruptions of the teachings, of the great thinkers of the modern age," and
that "the spirit of the age will shape how any message is understood," that spirit being
"one of skepticism").
i5 8 See LARRY J. SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY: HOW ATTACK JOURNALISM HAS
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS 66 (1991) (noting that too often "the press defines
[the] character [of political candidates]. .. 'in a totally negative sense'" (quoting Gary
Hart) (footnote omitted)); PAUL H. WEAVER, NEWS AND THE CULTURE OF LYING 164
(1994) (explaining that reporters deal with the contradictions of journalism by
"rejecting ideals,... expecting the worst.... perversely resisting good news," and
engaging in other cynical tactics); Paul Starobin, Generation of Vipers: Journalists and
the New Cynicism, COLUM.JOURNALISM REV., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 25, 26 (arguing that
a "pervasive cynicism" exists in the press-"a prejudice against the face value
explanations bordering on disbelief, accompanied by a ready willingness to ascribe
base motives").
" For alternative explanations as to why the public might find greater "culpabil-
ity" based on greater causal effects alone, see generally Michael S. Moore, The
Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237 (1994).
Criminal laws often punish morally identical acts differently simply because some acts
result in more severe consequences.
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other federal institutions. A skeptical public might dispropor-
tionately assume that bad government outcomes are the result of
mistakes in judgment, given that the president makes decisions in
an uncertain factual environment that too often cannot be assessed
directly. 190
D. Application of Political Strict Liability to
Executive and Judicial Nominations
One final example identifies the problem of individual assess-
ment of error in a somewhat different context. The public's
tendency to magnify individual error may also explain some of the
difficulties recently experienced by executive and judicial nominees.
A great deal has been written about our national preoccupation with
the personal background of nominees and the fact that nominees
appear to be disqualified for a minor error in their life or a
statement made at an inopportune time. A number of scholars have
suggested that we should not evaluate individual candidates based
on individual statements or personal history,' while others have
argued that such indiscretions are a valid predictor of future job
performance.
9 2
190 It should be noted that these negative judgments are not spread across society
as in other general systems of strict liability. Rather, they focus disproportionately
on the most visible political actor-the president.
19 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 20-22 (1994) (arguing that scrutiny during confirmation
hearings should focus on the candidate's qualifications, rather than disqualifications);
Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REV. 672, 672
(1989) (arguing that under the Framers' design, the Senate should look only to
professional qualifications, not to ideology or politics); David A. Strauss & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491,
1491-93 (1992) (arguing that the current process produces too much publicity and
information about nominees, thereby giving opponents ammunition); see alsoJOSEPH
P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 103 (1953) (describing Attorney
General Thomas W. Gregory's decision to hold open hearings on the Brandeis
nomination in order to bring to "public attention the fact that there was not sufficient
factual evidence to substantiate the various accusations" that had been made against
Brandeis).
192 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 93 (1985) (stating
that the screening ofjudicial nominees requires "critical assessment of the nominee's
character and intellect"); GaryJ. Simson, Thomas's Supreme Unfitness-A Letter to the
Senate on Advise and Consent, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 619, 627-37 (1993) (arguing that the
Senate's examination of a nominee's character is necessary because "[p]ublic
confidence in the Court depends greatly, perhaps more than anything else, on a sense
that the Justices are individuals of the highest personal integrity"); Nina Totenberg,
The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1213, 1213 (1988) (noting that "confirmation screening means digging, probing,
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Whatever the merits of these contrasting positions, it is
important to recognize that the problem is spawned in part by the
same social forces described above. When the domain of conduct
subject to scrutiny was quite limited, "good" candidates could
reasonably conceal their inadvertent errors, while those who did not
meet that standard could legitimately be considered unfit for the
job. Today, however, a "reasonably led life" could easily include
inadvertent errors that could disqualify an otherwise qualified
nominee. As we learn more about the life and personal background
of potential candidates, we necessarily find more errors-which
include, almost by definition, at least some inadvertent errors. But
how can we distinguish "reasonable" inadvertent errors from those
character flaws that justify rejection? As in the torts context, it is
increasingly difficult to make this distinction for informational
reasons. We simply lack the data about the personal lives of the
vast majority of Americans who never come within Washington
media scrutiny to know what the reasonably led life would look like.
In light of this analysis, President Bush's attempt to find a
"stealth nominee," such as Justice Souter,'93 is understandable
politically, whatever one's assessment of the substantive merits of
the choice. Rather than submit his nominee to a system of strict
liability, implicitly (or perhaps explicitly) Bush chose to impose the
opposite default rule. By proposing a candidate with a minimal
record, he avoided liability for Souter's personal behavior or
inadvertent statements.'94
learning about a nominee"); cf. Michael S. Paulsen, Straightening Out The Confirma-
tion Mess, 105 YALE L.J. 549, 446-70 (1995) (book review) ("[T]o the extent that the
appointments process is, by the Constitution's design, a public and political process,
litmus test substantive democratic review of judicial candidates is a logical,
constitutional, and appropriate consequence.").
193 See Richard Cohen, No Paper Trail, WASH. POST,July 26, 1990, atA27 ("Caught
between opposing forces on abortion-caught, indeed, between his own contradictory
statements on the issue-Bush pulled Souter from his hat. As usual, his intention was
to get over the next political hurdle. He has given us the stealth nominee.").
" As described above, individual appointments may also create difficulties
because of conflict mediation problems that occur whenever policies must be
captured and symbolized in one candidate. See supra part II.C. The nomination of
Dr. Henry Foster to the position of Surgeon General, in which he became a focal
point in the abortion debate, see John F. Harris, President Assails Foes of Abortion,
WASH. POT,June 25, 1995, at A4 ("[I]n the Foster [nomination] debate, Republican
critics... said that abortion is such a controversial procedure that a physician who
has performed them would be too divisive a figure to be the nation's most visible
public health advocate."), may fall into that category.
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V. OVERASSESSMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSIBILITY
A final and related way that the visibility and centralization of
the presidency may affect the power of the office is by leading to an
overassessment of presidential causal responsibility for government
policy. Numerous scholars and public opinion polls have shown
that the public views the president as the most responsible actor in
government. 195 This Part explores how the visibility and central-
ization of the presidency may not only influence this perception of
the institution, but, at the same time, undermine the legitimacy of
the person who holds the office.
A. The Problems of Determining Responsibility in Government
Determining political responsibility in American government is
not easy. The government structure established by the founders
divides power in order to avoid tyranny and promote delibera-
tion. I96 At the same time, this system seriously complicates the
public's assessment of the exercise of that power.I9 As a conse-
quence of the diffusion of responsibility in government, as well as
the costs of monitoring, the public has serious difficulty in assessing
the specifics of policy decisions, the marginal contribution of all the
different actors in government, and the quality of the judgment
exercised.
To fill this void during earlier electoral regimes, the public may
have relied more on retrospective evaluations of the government as
a whole. Because political parties were stronger and a single party
was more likely to "control" all of government, the members of the
public often only had to ask themselves whether or not they
approved of the government's policies. They assigned responsibility
to the party in power.' Parties thus served as brand names that
reduced the need for scrutinizing the marginal contribution of
195 See BRACE & HINCKLEY, supra note 90, at 44-47.
" See Sunstein, supra note 138, at 1548-51 ("The requirement of deliberation is
designed to ensure that political outcomes will be supported by reference to a
consensus (or at least broad assessment) among political equals.").
197 Indeed the inability to assess causal responsibility may be one source of the
exercise of civic virtue. See Fitts, Vices, supra note 47, at 1585.
19
8 See MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL
ELECTIONS 83 (1981) (stating that "citizens monitor party promises and performances
over time ... and rely on this core of previous experience when they assign
responsibility for current societal conditions"); V.0. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE
ELECTORATE: RATIONALITY IN PRESIDENTIAL VOTING 1936-1960, at 76-77 (1966)
(finding that "a political party cannot avoid accountability for its past performance").
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individual actors in government. 99
Unfortunately, as parties have broken down as collective entities,
branches become divided, and the day-to-day visibility of individual
actors in government increased, 0 0 the public has been more
clearly faced with evaluating the responsibility of individual
politicians who are part of the government. This has been especial-
ly true for the president and members of Congress, who exist in a
world of complicated and visible multicausality. Who is "responsi-
ble," for example, for the recent developments in health care
reform: Bob Dole, Bill Clinton, Ted Kennedy, or the American
Medical Association?
20'
B. Presidential Visibility and the Presumption
of Causal Responsibility
In this situation, one can easily understand the perceived value
of a modern, more unitary presidency. As noted above, there is
merit to an institution that has greater power to take action and, at
the same time, to be held more systemically responsible-that is, to
serve in somewhat the same role as strong parties. 20 2  Modern
'9 See ALDRICH, supra note 25, at 3 ("The political party as a collective enterprise,
organizing competition for the full range of offices, provides the only means for
holding elected officials responsible for what they do collectively." (emphasis added)).
200 There has been an extensive debate on the extent of party decline in the
United States. On the one hand, party identification in the public has decreased
significantly. Seegenerally WATTENBERG, supra note 36 (noting the trend toward split-
ticket voting and the decline in party identification, and positing as causes both the
perceived lack of party relevance and the mass media's influence); WATrENBERG, supra
note 37, at 31-46 (using the term "dealignment" to describe the change in party
identification and contending that the public views parties as neither meaningful nor
necessary). At the same time, however, party organizations have become stronger,
providing services and funds to those who choose to use the party name. See
ALDRICH, supra note 25, at 15.
201 The most difficult case in which responsibility must be apportioned occurs
when action truly is collective; in such situations, no single individual alone can have
any effect on the outcome. See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text. The one
exception may be in times of "high politics," when every actor in government tends
to be held responsible for overall government activity.
20 The theory of a modern unitary presidency presumes that the internalization
of the political costs and benefits of action in one person should reduce the political
mismatches that facilitate strategic behavior and government inefficiencies. See
OLSON, supra note 49, at 18 (noting that individuals within an organization have little
incentive to act for the collective good because each individual will reap only a minute
share of the gains achieved, despite considerable personal sacrifice); Moe, supra note
18, at 367-68 (recognizing that "[in determining his own preferences and making his
own decisions, the president does not suffer from the severe collective action
problems plaguing Congress, and he need not resort to complex structural
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presidents, however, still operate in a complicated political
environment in which numerous actors within all branches contrib-
ute to policy outcomes. Even with a unitary president, the public's
ability to determine who is responsible for what policy outcome, and
the extent of any mistakes, remains limited. In this context, the
centralization and visibility of the unitary president, which is viewed
as an advantage under theories of collective action, can also
contribute to the public's overestimation of presidential responsibility
and power.
First, the greater visibility of the unitary president can make the
presidency seem more powerful to the public than other institutions
that work their will more informally, such as Congress. This is
partially a result of psychological factors. As a number of political
scientists and psychologists have documented, the public often
manifests a heuristic bias toward overestimating the causal signifi-
cance of readily accessible factors."' In this case, the public's easy
access to information about a unitary and visible president's
exercise of power can make him seem more influential. There may
be pure instrumental reasons as well. When multiple actors exist,
the public has a rational tendency in evaluating governmental
responsibility to converge on a focal point-the most visible
actor.2 0 4 From the perspective, of individual voters and the press,
who attempt to understand and respond to government activity,
focusing on the most visible participant-the president-simply
reduces search costs.
20 5
arrangements for mitigating them").
20 This bias is technically called an "availability heuristic." See ALAN GARNHAM &
JANE OAKHILL, THINKING AND REASONING 160-64 (1994) (defining the "availability
heuristic" as the tendency for people to estimate the frequency and probability of an
event, or of an item having a property, based on the ease with which instances can
be brought to mind); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIALJUDGMENT 122-27 (1980) (arguing that the degree of
availability influences the acceptability of causal candidates); Paul Slovic et al., Fact
Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 465-72 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (examining
misperceptions about the frequency of specified causes ofdeath based upon whether
the particular causes of death had been discussed in the media and were therefore
easier to imagine or recall).
2o4 See SCHELLING, supra note 43, at 60 (noting that when many interests or players
are involved, one of them tends to become the "focal point").
205 One consequence of strict liability for the president may be the lack of
institutional accountability for individual members of Congress. It is very difficult to
hold individual members of Congress responsible for the actions of the institution.
See FIORINA, supra note 124, at 47 (noting that, while congressional bureaucracy serves
as a "lightning rod" for public frustration, individual members are able to maximize
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Second, the perception of greater presidential influence may
also have a normative explanation: the public may simply wish to
believe that there is a "flesh and blood" actor responsible for
government policies. As commentators on the mass media have
frequently observed, it may be simpler for the press to focus on a
single individual as the embodiment of government action and for
the public to conceptualize and accept public events on those terms.
Conflict and causal responsibility thereby become much more
politically understandable, and perhaps even morally acceptable.
20 6
Third, the president may contribute to this effect, at least over
the short run, by overstating his causal significance. As noted
above, part of the power of a unitary president is his ability to focus
attention on problems and galvanize action-that is, to serve as a
focal point of change. 207 Indeed, this has occurred at significant
moments of the modern presidency, such as the passage of the New
Deal, the Civil Rights Act, and major tax and budget reforms.
208
Yet the president's ability to serve as a focal point is often depen-
dent on overstating the importance of a problem and of his role in
bringing about change. This is what galvanizes public attention and
action, helping to overcome the rational ignorance that often
impedes government action.
20 9
the bureaucracy so as to prevent electoral defeat).
no The press in particular has a strong visual and cognitive incentive to simplify
the administration in the person of the president and to describe political conflict on
personality grounds. See MICHAEL B. GROSSMAN & MARTHAJ. KUMAR, PORTRAYING
THE PRESIDENT: THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE NEWS MEDIA 263-64 (1981) (discussing
the great number of White House stories reported by the major media in recent
years); STEPHEN HESS, THE GOVERNMENT PRESS CONNECTION: PRESS OFFICERS AND
THEIR OFFICES 5 (1984) (arguing that exploration of the government-press connection
has been limited by the fact that journalists and scholars tend to focus on the White
House and on election campaigns); see also GODFREY HODGSON, ALL THINGS TO ALL
MEN: THE FALSE PROMISE OF THE MODERN AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 15-16 (1980)
("[P]eople confuse the power of the United States with the power of the President,
failing to realize that he has only limited possibilities of harnessing and commanding
the nation's resources.").207 See MICHAEL NOVAK, CHOOSING OUR KING: POWERFUL SYMBOLS IN PRESIDEN-
TIAL POLITICS 24 (1974) (noting that symbolic power is a precondition to pragmatic
power); supra part I.A-B.
,20' See SKOWRONEK, supra note 33, at 288-324 (describing Roosevelt as an
"extraordinarily skillful politician successfully garnering new leadership resources
from modernity and methodically forging from them the foundations of presidential
government"); CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 16-26, 77-79 (1985) (describing
the efforts of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to arouse national support for civil
rights legislation); Fitts & Inman, supra note 8, at 1737-38 (describing tax reform).
20 As Theodore Lowi concludes, "The more the president holds to the initiative
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Finally, the public may hold the president more responsible
simply because individual members of Congress are less likely to be
held responsible. As many political scientists have observed, public
perceptions of members of Congress seem to present a classic
collective action problem, in which no one individual member
appears to have a significant effect on collective government action.
In this context, it can be quite easy to avoid individual responsibility
for collective decisions because each representative faces a pris-
oner's dilemma in effecting change. 2 0 No one is a "but for" cause
of an event. Even if the result is not literally collective, moreover,
the information problems faced by the public in assessing the
individual contribution of a representative in a body such as
Congress can be overwhelming. 21' Where constituents do not
surmount this prisoner's dilemma, individual members of Congress
who avoid responsibility enjoy a structural advantage.2 12 This is
one explanation for the well-known "incumbency effect" that
members of Congress enjoy, in which they avoid responsibility for
nationally contentious issues and claim it for locally favorable re-
suits.
213
A modern, more unitary president, on the other hand, seems to
come out on the other end in this process, due to the increased
authority and visibility he has within the modern government
structure. The assessment of joint causal responsibility can present
and keeps it personal, the more he reinforces the mythology that there actually exists
in the White House a 'capacity to govern.'" LOWi, supra note 2, at 151; see also BRACE
& HINCKLEY, supra note 90, at 46 ("Saying that presidents have power gives them
more power... ."); BARBARA HINCKLEY, THE SYMBOUC PRESIDENCY 2 (1990) ("[I]t
is part of the symbolism of the office that [presidents] are singularly responsible for
the nation's well-being.").
210 Simply holding an individual member responsible would be individually and
collectively irrational. The member faces a prisoner's dilemma in effecting collective
results: her acting alone will make no difference. See MUELLER, supra note 123, at 14.
211 The clearest case is one of those rare moments when the public as a whole
seems to hold all members responsible for collective results. In effect, individual
members are held strictly responsible for joint outcomes. The recent election may
fall into this category.
2'2 Other structural mechanisms, such as parties, might also serve this role. See
Fitts, Ignorance, supra note 47, at 941 (explaining how strong political parties reduce
public communication about individual political actors by focusing public attention
on party identification, with the result that party affiliation "overshadow[s] and
dwarf[s] the static of individual political communications").
21
3 See GARY C.JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 38 (1992)
(explaining that the congressional system allows incumbents to gain reelection by
"insulating members from blame for the general failures and inadequacies of the
institution").
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intractable moral and game theoretic problems. 214  Yet, to the
extent that power is viewed as a zero-sum game, avoidance of
responsibility by individual members of Congress can lead naturally
to a public overassessment of presidential responsibility; the president
may be the only person who can reasonably be assessed responsibil-
ity for collective decisions. While a number of scholars have
explored the legislative effect described above,2 15 few have analyzed
the executive contrapositive: overassessment of presidential
responsibility.
C. Effect on Presidential Influence
What are the long term effects of this perception on the
president's legitimacy and power? While the consequences are
obviously quite complex, there is reason to believe it can undermine
the support for and influence of the president in some contexts.
First, the perception of presidential influence may simply
exacerbate the problems of presidential visibility described above.
The perception of presidential power increases public scrutiny.
This makes the president even more central to the resolution of
symbolic and moral disputes in government, ranging from the
placement of his children in private schools to affirmative action.
Second, at the same time, the asymmetry in visibility creates an
environment that is conducive to strategic behavior by other actors
in government, for which the president may be forced to take
responsibility. To the extent that a system exists that holds one
actor responsible for the actions of others, free-riding members
have a clear incentive to act strategically. 216 This may explain why
individual members of Congress are often accused of being less
concerned with collective results. Opportunities for strategic
behavior can arise in a variety of situations, including international
affairs, such as Haiti, the Mexican bailout, Kuwait and Bosnia, as
214 
See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994)
(outlining game theoretic problems in the law). For a more philosophical analysis of
some of the same problems in assigning responsibility in collective action situations,
see generallyJeremy Waldron,Just Punishment for Trivial Harms (1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
2"5 See FIORINA, supra note 124, at 48-49; JACOBSON, supra note 213, at 38.
21 This situation corresponds to the activity level problem first identified in strict
liability, except that here it applies to the presidency. See Steven Shavell, Strict
Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1980) (stating that under strict
liability, the injurer "will be induced to consider the effect on accident losses of both
his level of care and his level of activity").
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well as in domestic areas, such as the budget deficit. As a result, it
may be difficult for a president to elicit cooperative behavior from
members of Congress.
Third, the president may have a perverse incentive to exacerbate
this process by overstating public problems and the need for action.
As noted above, one of the most important devices of a modern
president is his ability to mobilize support through the bully pulpit-
to take advantage of his unitary and visible position as a "focal
point."217 Unfortunately, this device has its costs. The president
may need to overstate the problem in order to generate an
appropriate level of attention and thereby to garner influence.
2 18
The president thus may gain strength over the short run, but when
he subsequently fails to meet heightened expectations, he can pay
a price in unrealized goals.
Finally, viewing the president-especially a strong unitary presi-
dent-as the responsible actor can add a great deal of uncertainty
and variation to assessments of "the .government," which can also
undermine the presidency. When government actions are attrib-
uted to a party or administration, positive and negative information
about particular party members are more likely to be evened out
over a series of policies. It is the party or government, in all its
complexity, that is being evaluated, not the individual member.
One negative event or action taken by an individual member does
not undermine the party's "brand name," especially over time. In
the case of a president held generally responsible for a broad range
of policy outcomes, the ups and downs can be less equalized. One
scandal or mistake, such as a Whitewater or Iran-Contra misstep,
can infect all government decisions and perceptions of governmen-
tal activity. To the extent the public considers predictability and
217 See DENISE M. BOSTDORFF, THE PRESIDENCY AND THE RHETORIC OF FOREIGN
CRISIS 231-36 (1994) (noting how presidents use crises for self-promotion); JAMES
PFIFFNER, THE STRATEGIC PRESIDENCY 7-8 (1988) (describing the president's need to
act at the beginning of the term).
218 See Lowi, supra note 2, at 170 ("Such are the president's channels of mass
communication that he must simplify and dramatize his appeals .... "); id. at 11
("Given the exalted rhetoric and high expectations surrounding the presidency, a
partial success is defined by the mass public as a failure."). A similar phenomenon
may be at work in the primaries, as the candidate with the most inflated claims rises
to the top, but then slips in the polls when faced with delivering after election day.
See E. Donald Elliot et al., Toward a Theoiy of Statutoy Evolution: The Federalization of
Environmental Law, 1J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 313,327-28 (1985) (describing how
a presidential aspirant could further his own goals by overemphasizing and
mischaracterizing the need for his proposed legislation).
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stability to be positive values in politics and institutions, focusing on
the vacillations of presidential behavior may, over time, thereby
undermine confidence in and the power of the holder of the
office.
219
This is not to suggest that the public perception of presidential
influence necessarily undermines the president's exercise of power.
As Robert Inman and I have argued, the perception of power can
be an important ingredient of power, especially when threatening
to discipline opponents and even supporters.220 Yet any assump-
tion that visibility will necessarily increase the president's influence
and legitimacy is unwarranted. Over time, increased visibility can
undermine various aspects of the president's power.
221
CONCLUSION
While the thesis developed in this Article has been subdivided
into a variety of separate analytical and factual claims, the general
argument can be summarized straightforwardly. Many of the
presidency's weaknesses flow from what most people-even its
critics-see as its chief strength: the singularity of the institution.
Scholars writing in the public choice and unitary executive tradition
in particular emphasize that the singularity of the presidency is a
source of its power, its political accountability, and its moral
legitimacy. Indeed, taken to a logical (and perhaps extreme)
conclusion, the principles behind a unitary presidency would seem
to favor a totally centralized and intensely visible office of the chief
executive, although proponents of a strong president recognize the
2
'9 Technically, this is simply a claim about variance; as an individual, the
president's accountability is subject to more variance.
"o See Fitts & Inman, supra note 8, at 1772-73. The president's ability to appear
powerful can be a critical component of his ability to overcome political collective
action problems-that is, it enables him to protect a position from incremental attack.
Where this is true, the president might prefer to appear more powerful in order to
instill fear in potential adversaries, even though this may lead him to look more
responsible for adverse results in retrospect.
221 Moreover, the presence of any "culture of distrust" would reinforce this
tendency, as would the incentive structure of the press and special counsel law. See
supra notes 183-90 and accompanying text.
The large payoff that a particular news organization receives from being the first
to break a story may create extraordinary and perverse incentives for news
organizations to dig up the "big stories" and to focus disproportionately on the
president. From a social perspective, competitors in pursuit of fixed or comparative
rewards rationally tend to overextend and overinvest. For a general overview of this
process, see ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY
125-46 (1995) (exploring incentives to overinvest in certain fixed or relative rewards).
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pluralistic and anti-tyrannical purposes served by legislative
institutions.
Centralized and visible power, however, becomes a double-edged
sword, once one explores the different ways in which unitariness
and visibility can undermine an institution's informal influence,
especially its ability to mediate conflict and appear competent. In
this context, the visibility and centralization of the presidency can
have mixed effects. As a single visible actor in an increasingly
complex world, the unitary president can be prone to an overassess-
ment of responsibility and error. He also may be exposed to a
normative standard of personal assessment that may conflict with
his institutional duties. At the same time, the modern president
often does not have at his disposal those bureaucratic institutions
that can help mediate or deflect many conflicts. Unlike members
of Congress or the agencies, he often must be clear about the
tradeoffs he makes. Furthermore, a president who will be held
personally accountable for government policy cannot pursue or hold
inconsistent positions and values over a long period of time without
suffering political repercussions. In short, the centralization and
individualization of the presidency can be a source of its power, as
its chief proponents and critics accurately have suggested, as well as
its political illegitimacy and ultimate weakness.
Of course, the complex problems of presidential legitimacy and
power also implicate many influences not explored here. On the
one hand, there can be no question that presidents make numerous
mistakes for which they are and should be held politically and
legally accountable. On the other hand, as the single most powerful
actors in government, they may be subject to excessive scrutiny,
overestimation of causal responsibility, and criticism, regardless of
what they do or say 222 or any structural changes in the system.
Political structure (and any analysis attempting to make sense of
that structure) may also take a back seat to underlying political
forces, as the recent off-year elections may exemplify.
223
222 Important cultural factors influence these assignments of error. See Moore,
supra note 189, at 267-71 (describing the types of experiences that justify attaching
increased moral blameworthiness to those whose actions actually cause harm).
"2 At least some of the problems associated with a unitary presidency are also
related to the declining influence of organized political parties in the United States,
a trend that will probably continue. As noted above, party structures afford the
president some advantages in meeting these concerns. For example, the traditional
party system offers an extralegal mediation device that can diffuse or prevent conflict.
The party is also strictly accountable for the consequences of government, but not
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Despite these caveats, the factors outlined in this Article clearly
impact on the success of the presidency. Absent structural change,
the president can often face a Hobson's choice. His unitariness and
visibility support his unique ability to facilitate democratic synoptic
change, but at the same time they also can undermine his ability to
avoid or resolve disputes. This undoubtedly explains the recom-
mendation of presidential pundits that modern presidents should
generally refrain from taking action. "Active presidents are not
rewarded in the polls; popular presidents win more but generally
ask less."
224
The primary purpose of the foregoing analysis has been
analytical and descriptive: to critique some of the common
theoretical assumptions of the political science and unitary
presidency literatures and, at the same time, to explicate the
complex effects of a more centralized and visible presidency. This
inquiry should also help explain our unease over presidential
performance and raise concerns about any wholesale attempts to
create a systematically unitary, centralized presidency. But are there
legal, policy, or strategic changes that might alleviate some of these
concerns? In other words, are there ways that the president can
confront these problems without undermining the useful influence
that he derives from his unitariness and centrality?
To explore some of these questions, Subpart A discusses legal,
structural, and political changes that might be seen as enabling the
president to confront these issues. 225 This analysis must be more
tentative, as the impact of legal changes may be quite different from
the effect of pure political approaches. Any solution will necessarily
involve a balancing of the president's roles. Subpart B then offers
some general observations about the significance of this analysis to
current scholarly work on the presidency.
scrutinized with respect to individual decisions, simply because it is a collective entity,
not an individual institution. Thus, unlike the presidency, a political party is less
likely to be subject to microassessment of individual decisions. In this sense, the party
depersonalizes the presidency. Finally, parties minimize the swings in evaluation (that
is, reduce the "variance") inherent in public assessments of government. Thus, when
the public evaluates a party, the mistakes or indiscretions of a particular member only
occupy a small component of its overalljudgment. See WATTENBERG, supra note 36,
at 10 (explaining how political partisanship "function[s] as a... stabilizing influence
on public opinion, and consequently on the political system as well").
24 BRACE & HINCKLEY, supra note 90, at 81.
"s While these proposals are ambitious, I have sought to avoid any illusions of
policy fine-tuning, which usually can be achieved only in the abstract minds of ivory
tower academics.
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A. Policy and Legal Recommendations
What legal and structural changes would alleviate the deleterious
effects of the president's unitariness and centrality? Any recommen-
dations must be sensitive to the president's political circumstances
and the imperfections in the public's perception of legal and
structural change, which may limit the public's ability to appreciate
structural differences. How often does the public, for example,
actually understand distinctions between presidential power over the
Federal Reserve, the FCC, and the Department of Justice? With
these caveats in mind, several approaches seem worthy of evalua-
tion.
First, one relatively straightforward way to improve the presi-
dent's mediation resources might be through the creation of ad hoc
commissions. As I described above, one of the advantages of
institutions such as Congress or the bureaucracy is that they
establish "neutral" procedures ex ante to which they are then
committed for dispute resolution. Over the past few years,
presidents have successfully established analogous entities, such as
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission 226 and the
National Commission on Social Security Reform. 227 Justice Breyer
has proposed the permanent establishment of a similar structure in
the executive branch-a risk assessment agency, which would make
risk assessment decisions for government by default.22 In these
and other cases, commissions can be used to avoid confronting
problems, as well as to distribute responsibility between political
branches and actors in order to resolve conflict and reach agree-
ment. If a president faced with a problem such as health care were
to appoint an independent commission drawn from all branches to
generate a proposal, his personal capital might not be dissipated so
easily-whether or not the group came to agreement.229  More
See supra note ?.
Exec. Order No. 12,335, 3 C.F.R. 217 (1981), revoked by Exec. Order No.
12,534, 50 Fed. Reg. 40,319 (1985); see also PAUL LIGHT, ARTFUL WORK: THE
POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 232 (1985) ("Commissions cannot supply the
leadership that others lack, [however]... if Congress and the President do decide to
move, commissions can provide cover.... They can provide the needed hiding
place.").
228 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 59-68 (1993).
The relationships developed over time between the members of such
commissions can facilitate the development of communal norms, such as those
created by the Social Security Commission, thereby facilitating agreement. Thus, by
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broadly, the creation of risk assessment agencies can insulate the
president from political conflict.
Needless to say, under this analysis, the critical question for the
president is to choose correctly when to assign contentious issues to
commissions for mediation and when, in exercising strong leader-
ship, to retain complete control in the White House. The impor-
tance of the choice was starkly revealed by President Clinton's
health care initiative, which relied on a secretive executive bureau-
cracy firmly under presidential control."' Had it succeeded, the
political benefits of this approach would have been great; the
success of the initiative would have been Clinton's success. But it is
not surprising, in light of the problems outlined above, that health
care reform failed-and that the costs of the failure were so great.
Once Clinton put forward the broad outlines of the plan, he could
neither mediate conflict between groups as an individual nor change
his position as an institutional actor without undermining his moral
legitimacy. By doing so, he would be changing his individual moral
commitments. Errors in the program also became his errors,
undermining his moral capital.231 Clinton's greatest problem, as
creating such commissions the president does not "pass the buck" or hide policy
choices, but rather establishes a new mechanism for resolving conflict.
Of course, some might fear that creating such commissions would resurrect the
independent agencies under a different name, and thus dissipate the president's power
insofar as they formally exist outside the president's control. Yet if my analysis is
correct, these entities could, contrary to popular wisdom, increase the president's
overall strength by giving him the ability to remove issues from the political agenda.
In this sense, my claim is consistent with those who have suggested that independent
agencies do not undermine the power of the president, because they are not really
independent; the president has informal influence over them through the budget and
appointments process. See Devins, supra note 127, at 275 (describing presidential
influence over independent agencies through the Attorney General and the litigation
process); Strauss, supra note 74, at 590-91 (describing presidential influence over
independent agencies through the selection of the chairman of the commissioners,
who tends to dominate both the commissions' policies and administrative decisions).
There are also important differences between independent commissions and the
independernt agencies, which increase the likelihood that these commissions could
strengthen presidential power. These commissions would be set up on an ad hoc
basis, and their members would be appointed by the president. As a result, they
would be created only when there were strong arguments in favor of a mediation
device and would be less likely to come under the long-term control of Congress, as
is often the case with the independent agencies.
' This initiative was a quintessential unitary presidential solution. For an
example of the problems plaguing this initiative, see Association of Am. Physicians
& Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 879 F. Supp. 103, 104-05 (D.D.C.) (requiring the
president's National Health Care Reform Task Force to produce documents for
public release), dismissed as moot, 879 F. Supp. 106 (D.D.C. 1994).
"' These difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that Clinton could not distance
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a result, was his inability to forge a consensus, leading to a general
perception that he personally failed on the issue.
232
This phenomenon also illuminates why the line-item veto,
applauded by proponents of the unitary presidency,233 may have
mixed consequences for presidential power. Under the unitary
presidency view, the line-item veto would seem unquestionably to
afford the president more power-the ability to invalidate part but
not all of legislation. Under the analysis put forward here, however,
the current veto structure allows the president to avoid having to
take a position and make clear choices on many portions of the
budget-the veto is too blunt an instrument to force his hand. Thus,
while material or symbolic interest groups seldom pressure the
president today to veto an entire budget package because of
individual narrow components, with a line-item veto the White
House could become the object of intense and widespread lobbying
efforts and media attention to influence action on numerous
provisions in the budget. The line-item veto might even produce an
incentive for Congress to increase this pressure by passing bills that
create conflict for the president to resolve.
234
The recent budget confrontation illustrates this effect: Clinton
his policies from the administrative official he chose to develop these policies-his
wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton.
2-2 Congress followed a similar proceduralist approach with the Entitlement
Commission, chaired by Senator Kerry. The Commission failed to reach an
agreement, but Clinton did not pay any of the political price for this result, as he did
during the health care debate (partly because the President neither placed a
representative on the Commission nor put his weight behind its efforts).
232 See Stephen Glazier, The Line-Item Veto: Provided in the Constitution and
Traditionally Applied, in CHARLES J. COOPER ET AL., PORK BARREL POLITICS AND
PRINCIPLE: THE POLITICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO 9, 15 (1988) (stating that
"Ronald Reagan and [other supporters of the unitary presidency] have called for a
constitutional amendment giving the President the line-item veto power"); Calabresi,
supra note 31, at 79 ("A line-item veto for appropriations matters could help.., by
enhancing the President's national, anti-factional voice and reducing the costs of a
veto."); L. Gordon Crovitz, The Line-Item Veto: The Best Response When Congress Passes
One Spending "Bill"a Year, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 43, 55 (1990) (arguing that the use of the
line-item veto is an appropriate presidential response to congressional attempts to
usurp his presentment clause veto power by passing one all-inclusive spending bill per
year); J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to
Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 437, 467-74 (1990) (arguing that the line-item
veto is necessary because otherwise Congress could pack an entire term's legislation
into a single bill, leaving the president effectively powerless to veto the entire bill).
2"4 This process has been observed in delegation to administrative agencies. See
e.g., Mashaw, supra note 18, at 82-83 (evaluating the argument that Congress should
resolve policy conflicts instead of delegating that authority to agencies through vague
legislation).
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was able to avoid internal conflict within his party and increase his
bargaining position by vetoing the Republican plan without putting
forward his own proposal or explaining precisely what he would not
accept. If he had had a line-item veto, he would have been forced
to make much clearer tradeoffs. Paradoxically, the line-item veto
could make the president politically responsible for the resolution
of most value conflicts and perceived waste in the federal budget.
The experience of vetoes in other contexts underscores this
concern. For example, at the state level the line-item veto has not
augmented the influence of governors in any systematic way;23 5 it
seems to increase their formal power but delegitimates its exercise.
Similarly, the motivation behind Congress's establishment of the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and passage of
omnibus budget bills has been to eliminate Congress's own ability to
line-item veto individual bases or other budget items. In these
cases, members of Congress report that they value their ability to
"tell constituent groups whose programs are being cut that the
omnibus measure was considered under procedures that permitted
only an up-or-down vote and that amendments to any part could
undermine the integrity of the whole bill."23 ' This is precisely
what the president would lose with a line-item veto.
Another way to improve the president's influence might be to
increase the number of presidential appointees in the agencies,
while relying less on White House review of agency decisions under
presidential executive orders. If the number of presidential
appointees in the executive branch were greatly increased, in theory
the president might be able to influence general policy more
informally through the appointment process without visibly
participating in individual decisions.2 37 The assumption behind this
approach is that decreasing the personal and visible involvement of
the president and the White House in specific decisions will reduce
" See Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Line Item Veto and Public Sector Budgets, 36J. PUB.
ECON. 269, 289-90 (1988) (presenting an analysis of state budget data that indicates
that the gubernatorial line-item veto does not alter long-term budgetary behavior).
There are other possible explanations, of course, including the legislatures' ability to
bargain around any veto.
2 WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS
76 (3d ed. 1989).
237 One of the purposes of Executive Order 12,291, see supra note 6, was to
increase presidential and political influence over the lower bureaucracy by requiring
agencies to submit regulatory impact analyses for all major rules. If the bureaucracy
were filled with more direct presidential appointees, the same objective could be
achieved less obtrusively.
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the number of identifiable stochastic errors for which the president
will be held personally responsible. These changes parallel the
previous proposed reforms in the political primary process, which
sought to make the candidates less central and exposed to public
visibility through the addition of superdelegates and closed
juries.2 "8  Likewise, by increasing presidential influence through
the appointment process, the president would be ultimately
responsible for the policy results of his actions, but would not be
personally and publicly involved in each individual judgment.
23 9
Needless to say, there are risks to this approach. As noted
above, the public perceives such formal connections only imperfect-
ly and probably only in the context of major changes. As a result
the president might be held accountable regardless of his actual
relationship to agency officials. In this sense, the legal and political
science effects may diverge, at least when legal changes are
incremental.
At the same time, this analysis may suggest that the indepen-
dence of independent agencies-the bte noire of proponents of the
unitary presidency-may have complicated effects on presidential
power. Independent agencies that are truly independent remove
issues from the presidential agenda. This is undoubtedly harmful
to the president in many cases, but under the analysis developed
here, it may be valuable in other circumstances. For example, when
contentious issues such as affirmative action and abortion are taken
off the president's political agenda by the Supreme Court, the
president can reap political advantage. 24  While no one would
2
s8 See JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
DEMOCRATIC REFORM 81-104 (1991) (discussing the conflict in America's political
process between political equality and deliberation and suggesting the use of a
"deliberative opinion poll" to reconcile these goals in presidential primaries); POLSBY,
supra note 37, at 174-80 (discussing proposals that would enable convention delegates
to vote for a candidate chosen deliberatively by the convention instead of binding
them to vote for the candidate they represented in the primary election).
" From this perspective, one can understand better the complications that flow
from the recent centralization of formal power in the hands of the president or his
direct personal appointees. In this regard, a parliamentary system, whereby cabinet
officials are elected independently and have autonomous legal and political status, can
diffuse at least some conflict more effectively. See generally PETER HENNESSY, CABINET
(1986) (describing the development and function of the cabinet system in Great
Britain).
240 Cf. HOLMES, supra note 113, at 227 (discussing the argument that "the success
of the American legislative process depends on 'its ability to exclude issues ... on
which there can only be one winner and one loser'" (quoting Walter Berns, Taking
Rights Frivolously, in LIBERALISM RECONSIDERED 51, 62 (Douglas MacLean & Claudia
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suggest that the existence of independent agencies increases
presidential influence overall, insulating particular types of activities
such as the social security reform, from strong presidential
direction, may be valuable. In light of this effect, a blanket
constitutional invalidation of independent agencies might have
complicated effects on public perceptions of presidential compe-
tence.
24 1
A third way to strengthen the president's influence might be to
change the nature of the media's access to day-to-day information
about the White House under GSA, FOIA, and FACA. It is clear
that access to quotidian information must continue for the agencies,
in which ultimate political accountability is less clear. But micro-
analysis of presidential or staff involvement might push the balance
in the other direction. At a minimum, application of FACA to
presidential commissions can ultimately undermine the president's
ability to mediate disputes in government.242 The Social Security
Commission, for example, was exempt from such scrutiny, and it
may be no accident that the Commission was highly successful.
Similarly, proposals that would subject presidential decisions to
greaterjudicial review-and more importantly discovery-might incur
high political costs and thus should be viewed with care.243
Finally, this analysis illuminates some of the problems with the
special counsel law, although there is no easy solution. The law has
two significant effects on presidential authority. First, and most
importantly, it subjects the president and his staff to independent
investigation and prosecution for criminal transgressions. In this
respect, the law serves a useful-probably necessary-function, given
potential conflicts of interest within the Department of Justice.
Mills eds., 1983))). The Supreme Court, however, is often unwilling to take on highly
political issues. For the classic analysis of the advantages of the Supreme Court's
avoidance ofissues, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 115-16, 133, 183-84 (1962) (describing the
political question and ripeness doctrines and the case and controversy requirement
as "devices for deciding not to decide").
241 Some commentators recommend constitutional invalidation of independent
agencies as a valid means of enhancing presidential power. See e.g., Miller, supra note
18, at 47-49 (describing the position taken by members of the Justice Department
during the Reagan Administration that independent agencies unconstitutionally
impair the power of the executive branch).
242 SeeBybee,supra note 16, at 125 (discussing how FACA impedes the president's
ability to "receive the full and frank views of the committee").24
- See Harold H. BruffJudicial Review and the President's Statutoiy Powers, 68 VA.
L. REV. 1, 50-61 (1982) (defining a standard for judicial review of the president's
statutory decisions).
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Second, in light of the fact that we have seen almost a perma-
nent special counsel, the position has important implications
regarding the disclosure of information about the intricate activities
of the president. A special counsel has investigated each adminis-
tration since the special counsel law was enacted. 244  Scholars
writing in the congressional dominance literature have shown how
Congress uses administrative procedures to identify and control
administrative discretion.245 The special counsel law may serve as
a similar instrument with respect to the presidency. Whatever the
other advantages of the law, the special counsel statute can open a
president to unlimited revelations regarding virtually any personal
action related to an investigated event. In situations where
inadvertent errors are likely to occur, it can be very difficult, if not
impossible, for any president or high official, regardless of the
propriety of the activity when viewed ex ante, to appear competent
or ethical ex post.246 If this effect of the law becomes as signifi-
cant in the coming years as it has been in the past, the law should
probably be repealed, or at least cut back in its coverage. Its effect
on presidential influence is too great, despite its overall value.
247
Of course, the analysis outlined here suggests that legal and
structural changes are only part of the problem (or of any potential
solution). A more visible president may be subject to strict political
liability because of cultural and social forces. The public may also
244 See EASTLAND, supra note 3, at 79-95 (presenting an overview of the special
counsel law, its creation, application, and destabilizing effects). The fact that a special
prosecutor investigates only one case, and does so under close public scrutiny, may
exacerbate the problem because she is poorly positioned to exercise prosecutorial
discretion. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 732 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the independent counsel may abuse its discretion and lose its
perspective due to its singular focus).
245 See McCubbins et al., supra note 76, at 273 (discussing how "[a]dministrative
procedures constitute an additional mechanism for achieving greater compliance");
see also McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 76, at 166 (discussing congressional
preference for "fire-alarm oversight" of administrative agencies that relies upon
"rules, procedures, and informal practices that enable ... examin[ation of]
administrative decisions").
24 The ambiguity of determining criminal behavior in the political context, such
as in cases of bribery, only exacerbates this effect. See Lowenstein, supra note 177,
at 801 (noting that "the law of bribery is neither 'precise,' 'consistent,' nor 'clear-
cut'").
247 A requirement that the special counsel law apply to both branches might
alleviate some problems by reducing the incentive for political actors to use it for
institutional combat. See BENJAMIN GINSBERG & MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICS BY OTHER
MEANS 26-31 (1990) (suggesting that the special counsel law has developed into a
powerful weapon in "political competition").
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ignore incremental structural and legal changes and hold the
president accountable no matter what his legal powers. To this
extent, his success may depend not only on political and legal
changes, but on his political skill in deflecting strict scrutiny or
forcing it upon other institutions. Indeed, his formal legal ability
to create such institutions, for example intergovernmental commis-
sions, may be consistent with strong presidential powers, although
in tension with some of the theoretical arguments put forward for
a centralized unitary office. That is why this Article has focused on
the theory of a visible and unitary president, which is related to legal
structures as well as presidential tactics.
B. General Policy Implications
Apart from the general policy analysis developed above, several
broad academic purposes also motivate this inquiry. One is simply
to identify and explain an important source of our frustration with
presidents so that we will be more sensitive to their position and
behavior. Even if one believes that increased visibility and central-
ization in the person of the president is on balance positive, as I do
in many cases, it is important to recognize the negatives. Under the
analysis developed here, at least some of the public and academic
frustration with presidents can be seen as a consequence of the
office, not the person who inhabits it. As we increasingly invest
power and visibility in presidents to move the country forward, we
are more likely to overestimate the power they have and overstate
the errors they make.
A second purpose of this Article is to contextualize the received
wisdom that a strong president will necessarily further democratic
and efficiency interests by virtue of the structure of the office.
Based on this presumption, legal scholars argue that "democratic"
agency decisions, as opposed to "technical" decisions, are more
appropriate for presidential review.24  At the same time, they
suggest that the president should have stronger control over
agencies and that judges should grant stronger deference to
agencies subject to formal presidential oversight.249  Yet the
248 See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 51, at 1195 ("If anyone is positioned to
coordinate diffuse regulatory policy, it is the President, as leader of the executive
branch.").
29 See e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress,
Deregulatmy Change; and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
1101, 1244 (1988) (arguing for a contextual deference to administrative decisions in
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analysis outlined above suggests that, even with structural changes,
a president with formal unitary powers may have an incentive not
to intervene in political disputes or, if he does, to avoid pursuing
high visibility democratic interests. If he should weigh in, more-
over, he may be quite ineffective. In short, the analytic and
empirical connection frequently drawn between the unitary
presidency, on the one hand, and democratic and efficiency goals,
on the other, is imperfect, and at some points in actual tension.
Finally, this Article has sought to illuminate the importance of
informal political factors to the power of the presidency and to our
conception about how it should be organized structurally. In an era
of instant communication and international visibility, the most
significant strength of the presidency is the chief executive's
capacity to lead, that is, "the power to persuade."2 50 To under-
stand the presidency in this environment requires an appreciation
of the president's ability to create focal points, mediate conflict, and
wield power legitimately. Legal academics who study the presi-
dency, therefore, cannot limit their analysis to the immediate formal
effect of a presidential veto or an appointment, but rather must
explore how these and other legal structures affect political
perceptions and influence. Over time, such informal perceptions
may have as much to say about the effectiveness of the presidency
and how it should be structured as the formal impact of the legal
rules.
response to increased presidential control over agency policy); RichardJ. Pierce,Jr.,
The Role of Constitutional and Political Theoty in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV.
469, 521 (1985) (arguing that the president's greater political accountability makes
him ideal for exercising political oversight of agencies).
250 See NEUSTADT, supra note 1, at 29-49.
